Hell in An Loc Read online

  The same message of U.S. support was broadcast the next morning on the city’s loudspeakers. The residents of An Loc could hear statements from the Senior Advisor to III Corps/MRIII appealing for calm and urging the people to defend the city at all costs. The American Senior Advisor also said that the U.S. Armed Forces would support An Loc with all air resources available. He introduced himself as General Hollingsworth and promised that he was ready to support An Loc.

  The following day, the 3rd Ranger Group Operation Center was hit by a 122mm rocket. The rocket crashed into a corner of the bunker causing a big explosion and sending shrapnel inside the command post. Colonel Biet and his S-3, Major Tran, standing near the situation map, were lightly wounded in the arm. (This was their second wound in a period of a few days in An Loc.) Captain Nang, the assistant S-3, who was waiting for his papers to be discharged from the army, was seriously wounded in the chest. Dr. Canh, the Ranger Group surgeon, reported that Nang was in extremely critical condition and needed to be evacuated immediately because he had many pieces of shrapnel in his chest, with some very close to his heart. Several radio operators were also wounded by shrapnel.

  The seriously wounded, including Captain Nang, were evacuated the next day by a U.S. medevac helicopter, which was able to land at the Ranger Group helipad between two artillery salvos. Capt. Nguyen Quoc Khue, Assistant S-3, later recalled that the senior U.S. advisor to the 3rd Ranger Group was concerned that the evacuation of Colonel Biet would adversely affect the morale of the rangers at a critical time in the defense of An Loc. He was reassured when Khue informed him that Colonel Biet and his S-3 would stay with the unit. 27

  Map 7: Defense Plan

  Meanwhile, with the reinforcement of the 3rd Ranger Group and the 8th Regiment, General Hung outlined the general defense plan of An Loc as follows:

  - 3rd Ranger Group (1,300 men) under Lt. Col. Nguyen Van Biet, was assigned the northeastern sector. Because the defense area was relatively large, the Rangers were to adopt a “mobile defense” tactic in their area of responsibility. One company from the 52nd Battalion was dispatched to occupy Hill 169, four kilometers southeast of An Loc.

  - 8th Regiment (2,100 men) under Col. Mach Van Truong was assigned the northern sector.

  - 7th Regiment (2 battalions) under Lt. Col. Ly Duc Quan was assigned the southwest sector (850 men).

  - 9th Regiment (-): 200 escapees from Loc Ninh and Can Le bridge.

  - The remnants of TF-52 (500 men) were put in reserve and occupied a central area between the 8th Regiment and the 3rd Ranger Group.

  - The Binh Long Provincial forces, supported by two 105mm howitzers and consisting of eight RF companies, PF and PSDF (about 2,000 men) were assigned the southern sector of the defense perimeter.

  In addition to the two 105mm howitzers organic to Binh Long Sector, the An Loc garrison was supported by the 51st Artillery Battalion and one 155mm howitzer battery. The artillery units had about 300 men. The total effective force of the garrison, including 5th Division Headquarters and the 5th Reconnaissance Company, amounted to about 7,500 men.

  On the American side, General Hollingsworth directed that non-essential advisors be evacuated. However, he was determined to avoid a repetition of the disastrous effect of the pull-out of American advisors in MRI—which was in part responsible for the collapse of the ARVN 3rd Division in Quang Tri in May 1972. Hollingsworth notified the twenty-five or so American advisors to remain with their South Vietnamese units for the duration of the siege.28

  The enemy, on the other hand, massed three infantry divisions, supported by tanks and artillery regiments, for the attack on An Loc and the interdiction of Route 13. The NVA’s order of battle, based on ARVN/JGS intelligence reports, consisted of the following units:

  - 9th Division (about 7,200 men) with 271st Regiment, 272nd Regiment and 95C Regiment.

  - 5th Division (5,200 men) with 274th Regiment, 275th Regiment and E6 Regiment.

  - 7th Division (7,000 men) with 165th Regiment, 209th Regiment and 141st Regiment. This division was reinforced with the 11th Anti-Aircraft Regiment with 1,800 North Vietnamese soldiers. The mission of this division was to establish blocking positions at Tan Khai, about ten kilometers south of An Loc. (The 141st and 165th Regiments were later directed to reinforce the attacking units at An Loc during the second and third assaults on the capital city of Binh Long.)

  - 75th Artillery Division (4,000 men) with 42nd Artillery Regiment, 208th Rocket Regiment and 271st Anti-Aircraft Regiment. In addition, NVA troops had captured a number of artillery pieces from TF-52 in the battle of Loc Ninh.

  - 202nd Tank Regiment and 203rd Tank Regiment (500 men). These regiments were equipped with T-54, PT-76 tanks and BTR-50 armored personnel carriers, not counting a few M-41 tanks and M-113 armored personnel carriers from TF 1-5, which were captured north of Loc Ninh.

  - 429th Sapper Group with an effective force of 1,100 men.

  The total strength of the attacking forces, including independent regiments and other support units—and excluding the NVA 7th Division’s blocking units on Route 13—amounted to about 21,000 men or about three times ARVN forces defending An Loc during the first phase of the siege. The NVA had many tanks and other armored vehicles while the ARVN had none. The ARVN, however, had the support of the South Vietnamese Air Force backed up by formidable U.S. airpower. The defenders, on the other hand, were determined to defeat the aggressors and to hold An Loc at all costs. President Thieu, in fact, had publicly directed senior officers and ARVN troops in An Loc to defend the city to the death and told them the nation was watching. His message had an electrifying effect on the defenders; it also constituted an open challenge to the enemy. Colonel Miller, senior advisor to the 5th Division, later commented that for President Thieu, An Loc was a “Bastogne, a place where stand or die defense would decide the fate of the enemy offensive closest to the national capital.”29 It may be more accurate, in my opinion, to compare An Loc to Verdun or, better yet, Leningrad, where the fate of the entire nation hinges on the outcome of one single battle.

  Meanwhile, artillery, mortar, and rocket fire continued to increase, and ARVN patrols outside of An Loc encountered increasingly stronger enemy resistance. Refugees from surrounding hamlets reported sightings of tank units moving toward the city. Also, according to the civilian population, food displayed at local markets had all but disappeared; intelligence reports later indicated that these commodities, particularly sugar and dry foods, had been bought or taken by the enemy to supply their front-line units. ARVN soldiers who were captured at Loc Ninh, but who escaped and made their way to An Loc, reported that the enemy told them they would take the capital city of Binh Long at all costs. This intelligence and other reports indicated to General Hollingsworth that the attack on An Loc was about to begin. On April 12, Hollingsworth flew to Saigon to meet with General Abrams to request additional B-52 strikes. General Abrams agreed with Hollingsworth’s assessment and directed that B-52 missions (also known as Arc Light) be diverted from I and II Corps the next day in order to support An Loc.30

  Five

  The First Attack on An Loc

  While the defenders took advantage of the lull preceding the attack to reinforce the garrison with fresh units, the NVA brought in additional anti-aircraft outfits in an effort to cut off resupply by air. At the time the attack on An Loc began, the NVA had up to nine anti-aircraft battalions positioned around the city. On the morning of April 12, a Chinook helicopter from Bien Hoa-based VNAF 237th Helicopter Squadron, piloted by Maj. Nguyen Huu Nhan, deputy squadron commander, was shot down over An Loc by enemy mortars and anti-aircraft fire while on an ammunition resupply mission. The hovering helicopter burst into a ball of flames over the LZ. All five crewmen were killed. Lt. Col. Nguyen Phu Chinh, the 237th Helicopter Squadron commander, later reported that his squadron had previously received a unit citation by III Corps for outstanding service; it also had received the Chinook pin and many letters of commendation from Boeing Company—which manufacture
d the Chinook helicopter—for having achieved 25,000 flying hours without accident. Alas, this safety record was shattered at An Loc where the 237th Helicopter Squadron lost ten Chinooks in a two-month period. Eleven officers and eighteen NCOs were killed; four officers and three NCOs were wounded.1

  The same day, the provincial RF unit manning the eastern gate of An Loc reported that enemy forces were advancing toward the city behind the civilian population from Quan Loi. Not sure how to handle the situation, the RF unit commander requested the province chief’s instructions. Colonel Nhut ordered the RF soldiers to fire overhead and to shoot at the civilians only if the enemy forces moved behind them to assault friendly positions. Nhut also requested U.S. gunships to shoot behind the civilians to stop NVA forces from using them as a human shield for their attack. As a result, the civilians fled in all directions. A great majority raced toward An Loc. Nhut directed the hamlet and village chiefs to identify their respective residents before directing them toward various temporary refugee camps.2

  In the meantime, Pastor Dieu Huynh led about 500 Montagnards from neighboring villages to seek refuge at the railroad station at the eastern perimeter of the city. Families of RF and PF units as well as members of provincial territorial units, fleeing their overrun outposts, flocked to military bases to seek protection, food, and medical care. General Hung ordered all unit commanders to carefully screen these arrivals to prevent possible enemy infiltration.3

  In anticipation of the enemy attack, III Corps provided uninterrupted tactical and B-52 support during April 11 and 12. U.S. pilots reported numerous secondary explosions. In particular, an air strike at an area five kilometers west of Phu Lo Gate at 5:00 P.M. on April 12 caused a big secondary explosion followed by series of explosions lasting until 10:00 P.M. Division intelligence officers believed that the air strike had hit an NVA advance ammunition depot.4

  During the night of April 12, the enemy intensified the shelling of An Loc with all kinds of calibers. One round hit the provincial communication center, killing seven and wounding seven more. Civilian telephone communication with the outside world was completely cut off. The volume of the artillery barrage increased dramatically in the early hours of April 13. “Not a single square meter of An Loc was free of impacts from 82mm mortars, 122mm rockets, 130mm guns, and also from 105mm and 155mm howitzers captured by the enemy in Loc Ninh and from TF-52 at Hung Tam Base,” wrote Gen. Tran Van Nhut in his memoir.5 The original 5th Division Forward CP on the east side of the city was also destroyed. Fortunately, General Hung had decided early on to move his CP to the old Japanese underground compound. The Catholic church and the railroad station were also hit by artillery fire, causing heavy casualties to the refugees. General Hung ordered the regimental medical teams to go to these places to provide first aid to the wounded civilians.6

  About 4:00 A.M., a reconnaissance patrol from the 7th Regiment reported hearing the sounds of tanks moving in the rubber plantations to the west. Trip flares and claymore mines laid by ARVN units in front of the perimeter of defense started to go off as the NVA tried to probe the defense line. An AC130 Spectre gunship was called; it fired on some trucks identified in the rubber trees.7

  Map 8: First Attack on An Loc

  The first attack on An Loc began at 5:15 A.M. The attack was launched by the 9th Division supported by elements of a tank battalion. (The 5th Division—that had suffered heavy losses during the battle of Loc Ninh—needed additional time to reorganize and reequip before joining forces with the 9th Division.) The assault was preceded by intense artillery preparation on Dong Long airstrip and on An Loc city itself. The fuel and ammunition depot at the airstrip was hit and exploded. The RF battalion defending the airport was overrun by tank-supported enemy assaults and had to withdraw and join forces with the Binh Long territorial units in the southern sector of the garrison. At the same time, the units defending the northern sector reported a column of tanks and trucks was moving toward the city on Route 13. An AC-130 Spectre, which was covering An Loc, swung into action and destroyed one tank and four trucks.8

  While the NVA concentrated their artillery barrage on the northern perimeter, the 8th Reconnaissance Company and the RF unit defending Dong Long Hill beat back three successive human-wave assaults and destroyed two T-54s and one PT-76.9 Around 6:00 A.M., the 8th Reconnaissance Company reported that it was being overrun by enemy tanks. Col. Mach Van Truong, 8th Regiment commander, ordered the reconnaissance company to fall back toward Hoang Hon Boulevard and become the reserve for the regiment.10

  The capture of the strategic Dong Long Hill provided the enemy with unrestricted fields of observation in the northern sector of An Loc. Dong Long was also an ideal site for the enemy to position its anti-aircraft weapons, mortars, and recoilless rifles to shoot with deadly accuracy at incoming aircraft and ARVN units defending the northern perimeter of defense.

  Effective immediately, on order from General Hung, all units activated their AN/PRC25 radio sets, which were used only in cases of emergency and when the telephone lines were disrupted by enemy artillery fire. Day and night, every time a telephone line was cut off, the 5th Signal Battalion and the signal units of the regiments had to repair the line, and many members of the signal teams were killed in their line of duty. (After the siege, General Hung organized a special ceremony in Lai Khe to recognize the achievements of the signals personnel and award decorations to the heroes of the signal units in An Loc.)11

  At 7:00 A.M., the enemy shifted their artillery fire toward the center of the city and their infantry began to attack. On the east and west sides, outbursts of gunfire rang out without interruption: The 3rd Ranger Group and the 7th Regiment were also under attack and were engaging the enemy in their sectors.

  On the north side, the column of tanks continued to move slowly toward the city. On each side of the road, one reinforced infantry battalion progressed alongside the tank column. When the tanks reached the area that was previously targeted by ARVN artillery, just north of the defense perimeter, Maj. Hoang Trung Liem, the artillery liaison officer with the 8th Regiment, ordered a “fire for effect.” At the same time, the 81mm mortars of the regiment started to fire on the accompanying infantry. The latter, taken by surprise, ran in all directions; the tanks in the rear of the column were stopped by artillery fire while the tanks in the front, unable to back up, continued to progress without infantry.12

  However, the enemy tanks were able to regroup after the cessation of ARVN artillery interdiction fire, and a column of about fifteen M-54s started to move south on Ngo Quyen Street, which was the section of Route 13 that traversed the city of An Loc. When the tanks were about to reach Nguyen Trung Truc Street, the soldiers from the 8th Regiment positioned on the high-rise buildings on both sides of Ngo Quyen Street began to fire their M-72s and machineguns from the buildings’ windows, killing or wounding many tankers, and causing the remaining enemy machine gunners to abandon their weapons, close the hatches, and hide inside their tanks. When the lead tank reached Hoang Hon Boulevard, the third tank in the column was hit by an M-72 rocket fired by a soldier of the regiment. The tank exploded and burst into flames; the burned tankers jumped out of the tank and rolled back and forth on the sidewalks in pain; they were finished off by a volley of M-16 bullets. While the lead tanks continued to roll down toward the center of the city, the tanks in the middle of the column, right behind the burned tank, had to stop and the soldiers of the 8th Regiment took this opportunity to kill three more. The tanks at the end of the column backed up and turned left and right; three tanks were destroyed by the soldiers of the 3rd Ranger Group and two by the 7th Regiment.13

  The two lead tanks, which had escaped the 8th Regiment’s ambush, accelerated and rushed southward. The first tank, approaching Phan Boi Chau Street from the north, was closing in on the 5th Division’s headquarters. The soldiers guarding the gate of General Hung’s underground command post panicked and ran for cover because this was the first time they had faced an enemy tank and also because they didn
’t believe in the effectiveness of the M-72 weapon. General Hung grabbed a hand grenade and was ready to hurl it at the enemy in case they ventured into the bunker. As the tank was turning around in an effort to identify the location of General Hung’s command post, Col. Le Nguyen Vy, deputy division commander, emerged from the underground bunker, aimed his LAW at the tank and set it ablaze just in front of the division headquarters. The tank was finished off at the junction of Phan Boi Chau and Hoang Hoa Tham Streets by the soldiers of the 7th Regiment. The second tank turned back and was hit by one 105mm round from a battery of the 51stArtillery Battalion executing a direct fire in the vicinity of Tao Phung Park; the damaged tank was destroyed by soldiers from the 8th Reconnaissance Company when it tried to escape toward Hoang Hon Boulevard.14

  Nguyen Cau, a TV reporter who stayed at An Loc during the entire siege, recalled that, when the enemy tanks were closing in on his command post, General Hung told his staff that he would not be captured alive and that in case he had to commit suicide, they must destroy the Division’s signal code immediately.15

  While all this transpired, at around 9:00 A.M., U.S. Cobras armed with 2.7-inch rockets asked the 8th Regiment to mark the tanks that had been already destroyed (with smoke grenades) so that they could chase the tanks that were still in operable condition. Mach Van Truong gave the U.S. Cobras credit for killing a total of four tanks in his area.16

  At 10:00 A.M., elements of the NVA 9th Division renewed their assault on the northern sector. In the 8th Regiment area, despite effective close air support, the enemy succeeded in capturing the two northern blocks of lightly built houses, forcing the regiment to fall back to a new defense line running generally along Nguyen Trung Truc Street.