Hell in An Loc Read online

  The battle subsided somewhat by the evening of April 13 without a clear line of contact. NVA artillery fire, however, continued unabated. Colonel Miller summed up the situation quite well when he later commented: “We had the south side, they had the north side, and it was a no-man’s land in the middle. There were mistakes on both sides that first day, plenty of them, but we must have made fewer because we were still there when it quieted down, and that means we were there from then on in my opinion.”33

  That night, Colonel Truong paid a visit to the LCDBs. While the regular soldiers were seeking cover in their foxholes or bunkers during enemy artillery bombardments, the LCDBs were assembled and kept under watch in an empty room without any protection. Colonel Truong told the LCDBs he would arm them and would request that they be restored to their old military status if they volunteered to join his battalions and fight. The LCDBs were elated; all volunteered to serve. Truong was well aware that he didn’t have the authority to reenlist the LCDBs, but in a time of crisis when the very destiny of the nation was at stake, he was willing to make that decision to save the LCDBs from being annihilated by enemy artillery and at the same time to be able to replenish the ranks of his depleted battalions. Fortunately, the Department of Defense subsequently approved the 5th Division’s request to restore the status of the LCDBs fighting in An Loc. Two hundred LCDBs had died during the siege and, thanks to the Department of Defense’s decision, their families were able to receive pension benefits reserved for families of soldiers who fought and died for their country. 34

  According to a 5th Division post-action report, the total friendly and enemy losses for the day were as follows:

  Friendly: 28 KIA (Killed in Action), 53 WIA (Wounded in Action), 6 MIA (Missing in Action).

  Lost: 3 crew-served and 42 individual weapons

  Enemy: 169 KIA, 2 captured.

  Weapons captured: 3 crew-served and 5 individual weapons, 2 radio sets; 16 tanks destroyed.35

  In Saigon that day, the Senate stopped its scheduled meetings to vote a resolution expressing the gratitude of the people to ARVN troops fighting in all fronts.

  On April 14, the enemy continued its sporadic artillery fire, mostly in the southwestern sector of the city. As if to keep the momentum alive, a tank company with nine T-54s and two self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, supported by small groups of infantry, attacked the 8th Infantry Regiment in the western sector after an intense artillery preparation. The attack was repulsed by the defenders and Cobra gunships only a hundred meters from the 5th Division command bunker.36

  In anticipation of renewed tank-supported attacks, General Hung ordered the immediate creation of “tank-destroying teams” at battalion level. Each battalion selected the best and most courageous soldiers in their unit to act as team leaders. Each team also consisted of members of the PSDF and even civilians who were familiar with the terrain and knew the best sites to ambush and destroy the enemy tanks without being detected. The tank-destroying teams operated only in the battalion’s area of responsibility and were armed with M-72s and sometimes with B-40 and B-41 rocket launchers captured from the enemy. These teams had killed many tanks in the subsequent attacks, and many of these unsung heroes had also died chasing enemy tanks.37

  Although An Loc had withstood the initial assault, like Dien Bien Phu after the first exploratory human wave assaults, it knew that tougher days still lay ahead.

  One item of encouraging news, however: the 1st Airborne Brigade, which was moving northward from Route 13 to relieve the garrison of An Loc and which had met stiff resistance from elements of the enemy 7th Division, was heliborne directly to the vicinity of Doi Gio Hill about four kilometers southeast of An Loc. The first elements had landed at 2:30 P.M. on April 14. Also on that day, General Minh, III Corps commander, moved his forward CP to Lai Khe to directly take charge of the Binh Long campaign, including the operation to reopen Route 13.

  ARVN commanders responsible for the defense of An Loc. From left: Col. Tran Van Nhat, Binh Long province chief; Col. Le Quang Luong, 1st Airborne Brigade commander; Lt. Gen. Nguyen Van Minh, III Corps commander; Brig. Gen. Le Van Hung, 5th Division commander. ARVN photo.

  ARVN soldiers on a destroyed T-54 tank in An Loc. ARVN photo.

  A PT-76 tank destroyed in the New Market. ARVN photo.

  An ARVN defender with antitank LAWs. ARVN photo.

  ARVN defenders aiming their LAWs at approaching NVA tanks. ARVN photo.

  ARVN soldiers with a captured anti-aircraft weapon. ARVN photo.

  81st Airborne Commando cemetery in An Loc. ARVN photo.

  President Nguyen Van Thieu and Brig. Gen. Le Van Hung touring the streets of An Loc after the siege, July 7, 1972. ARVN photo.

  President Thieu talking to ARVN soldiers in An Loc, July 7, 1972. ARVN photo.

  Six

  The Second Attack on An Loc

  The landing of the paratroopers in the Doi Gio area added a new dimension to the battle of An Loc: it forced the enemy to try to capture the city before the rescuing units joined forces with the defenders. So, after only one day of recuperation and refurbishing, the enemy renewed their efforts to take An Loc. Following their usual tactics of “tien phao hau xung” (or first, artillery; next, assault), the enemy unleashed a devastating artillery barrage on the city on April 15 from 4:30 A.M. to 6:00 A.M. causing multiple fires. Over 1,000 artillery rounds of all calibers slammed into An Loc. The NVA gunmen were specifically targeting the 5th Division and Binh Long Sector headquarters in the southern sector.

  At 6:00 A.M., the enemy’s 9th Division launched a two-pronged attack with the 272nd Regiment supported by a tank company in the north and northwest, and the 271st Regiment supported by another tank company in the west.

  At 7:00 A.M., the 272nd Regiment broke through the defensive positions of the 8th Regiment, which had to fall back to Hung Vuong Street, about 500 meters south of the original northern perimeter of defense. The 3rd Ranger Group also withdrew under heavy enemy pressure to establish a new defense line along Tran Hung Dao Boulevard, one block south of Hung Vuong Street.

  The enemy, however, didn’t seem to have learned from their past mistakes. This time, enemy tanks again penetrated deeper into ARVN’s positions without infantry protection. The first tank was destroyed on Nguyen Du Street by the 36th Ranger Battalion. The second tank was hit by an Air Force rocket and burst into flames in the vicinity of the New Market. A third tank just entering Tao Phung Park was destroyed by the artillerymen from Battery C, 51stArtillery Battalion, executing a direct fire with the only usable 105mm howitzer. The fourth and fifth tanks were finished off by the soldiers of the 8th Regiment near the Old Market.1

  Also this time, learning from the experience from the first attack, the defenders emerged from their bunkers and foxholes as soon as the NVA shifted their artillery barrage, and fired at close range at the enemy attacking infantry and tanks. The defenders used not only their organic M-72s to destroy the tanks, but they also put to good use the B-40 and B-41 rocket launchers captured from the enemy.

  Enemy tanks rolling in the streets without infantry protection were easy prey for the “tank-destroying teams,” which were hastily created and trained on order of General Hung right after the first attack. In his memoir, Gen. Mach Van Truong had nothing but praise for these teams who knew every corner, dead end, and back alley within the city and who chose the most propitious ambush sites to destroy enemy tanks rolling aimlessly on narrow city streets.2

  By 10:00 A.M., the enemy and ARVN forces were engaging in furious close combat along the Hung Vuong–Tran Hung Dao line. With effective support from the audacious U.S. Cobra gunships pilots—who braved intense anti-aircraft fire to provide urgently needed assistance—the stubborn defenders were able to organize new defense positions along the above line.

  The attack on the west was blunted before it began. First, the enemy sent one sapper unit to open the barbed wire fence at the western gate to allow the tanks to attack ARVN positions on the defense perimeter.
The sapper company was wiped out by elements of the 8th Regiment defending the northwestern sector; three prisoners were captured. Then, as the 271st Regiment and one tank company entered a plantation located four kilometers west of An Loc, and began to deploy in formations for the final assault, they were hit by a preplanned B-52 “box.” (In U.S. military jargon, one B-52 “box” is usually one rectangle of one by two kilometers drawn on the intended target to be saturated with bombs from three B-52s, each B-52 carrying a 38,000-pound bomb load.) Due to heavy casualties, the 9th Division cancelled the 271st Regiment attack. A document captured afterward disclosed that at a meeting on April 17, the NVA 9th Division confirmed that the entire staff of the 271st Regiment and one infantry battalion had been destroyed by the B-52 strike. Because there was no available replacement for the regiment commander and other regiment staff officers, the attack on the western wing was cancelled entirely.3

  By the afternoon of April 16, the fighting inside An Loc abated somewhat as NVA units were consolidating their newly gained territories in the northern half of the city and the defenders were busy organizing new defensive positions. In certain areas, the two opposing forces were separated only by the width of a street.

  Map 9: Second Attack on An Loc

  Following are the friendly and enemy losses after the second attack on An Loc on April 15:

  Friendly:

  18 KIA, 89 WIA, 38 MIA

  An unknown number of individual weapons was lost.

  Enemy:

  13 KIA left on the field (an unknown number of KIA carried away); 3 prisoners were captured.

  The entire headquarters and staff of 271st Regiment and one battalion destroyed.

  10 tanks destroyed on the streets of An Loc.4

  As NVA and ARVN troops—bracing for renewed fighting—were skirmishing and exchanging fire along a new demarcation line, enemy sappers detonated the field ammunition depot at Lai Khe on April 16, triggering multiple explosions. Against this embarrassing backdrop, General Minh, III Corps commander, declared to the press at his forward command post at Lai Khe that the dangerous period had passed and that he was cautiously optimistic about the situation in An Loc. He also said that his troops were prepared for the next waves of attacks by NVA forces.

  As the nation was anxiously watching the progress of the enemy offensive in Binh Long and Quang Tri provinces, the NVA opened a new front on the Central Highlands: on April 15—coincidental with the second attack on An Loc—NVA’s 320th Division and 10th Division, supported by T-54 tanks units, launched a two-pronged attack aimed at the 44th Regiment of the 23rd Division, which was defending the high ground northwest of Kontum, and the 45th Regiment manning the central sector, after intense artillery preparation. At the same time, the NVA 2nd Division made diversionary attacks in Binh Dinh coastal province.

  The previous day, the 23rd Division had captured a secret enemy message directing the attacking units to be prepared to start the attack at 5:00 A.M. Although the exact date of the attack was not specified in the message, Col. Ly Tong Ba, 23rd Division commander, inferred from the detected movement of VC’s B3 Front5 Headquarters toward Kontum, that D-Day would be the following day. Consequently, he requested emergency B-52 strikes on suspected enemy assembly areas north of Kontum for April 15; he also ordered division artillery to prepare preplanned artillery concentrations on the enemy’s likely avenues of approach.

  Thus, when the NVA units deployed for the initial assault on the 44th Regiment position, the defenders were ready. Supported by close-range B-52 strikes and intense artillery interdiction fire, the South Vietnamese threw back multiple enemy assaults, inflicting heavy casualties on the attackers. A column of T-54s rolling down RN 14 toward the city was engaged by the 1/8 Tank Company. Three T-54 tanks were destroyed; the rest turned around and fled.6

  While the NVA’s western prong was beaten back by the 44th Regiment, the central sector was subjected to repeated enemy assaults supported by murderous 75mm recoilless rifle fire from the high ground to the north. Under pressure, two battalions of the 45th Regiment withdrew to a new defensive line in the vicinity of the cemetery on the northern edge of the town on April 17. The next day, Colonel Ba ordered the 1/8 Tank Company to counterattack. The 1/8 engaged the North Vietnamese units on their right flank and succeeded in crushing the enemy penetration with the help of elements of the 45th. The 1/8 Tank Company commander reported many enemy bodies were left around the cemetery. The tank company suffered eighteen KIA (including three officers), thirty WIA (including four officers); six tanks were damaged.7

  Thus, like General Hung in An Loc, Colonel Ba in Kontum had won the first phase of the NVA’s 1972 Easter offensive; but, unlike General Hung who was trapped inside An Loc, Ba was able to evacuate his wounded soldiers, get resupplies, and bring in replacements for his depleted units by helicopters despite continuous enemy artillery interdiction fire.

  Meanwhile at An Loc, taking advantage of the respite after the second attack, Vietnamese and foreign journalists flocked to the city to personally assess the real situation in the garrison. General Hung, interviewed by Vietnamese reporters about the morale of his troops, declared, “As long as I am alive, An Loc will be alive.”8

  On April 17, the 5th Division sent two reporters—one American and one Frenchman—to the rangers’ sector to do a battlefield report. These reporters accompanied the units from the 52nd and 36th Battalions that were battling the NVA in an effort to expand the rangers’ area of responsibility. They were able to take some good pictures and footage of the battle of An Loc. They even got inside enemy tanks to search for documents and other interesting materials. In one of these tanks, the American and French journalists took pictures of dead North Vietnamese tank men chained to their tank. They also discovered on their bodies ivory-colored pills, which were later confirmed by Saigon labs to be stimulants. The pictures of dead tank men chained to their tank and the accompanying stories later appeared on the world press and constituted a good counterpropaganda to the Communists’ statements that their soldiers were highly motivated fighters who were ready to sacrifice their lives for the cause of socialism. They also showed to the world that in the North Vietnamese Army, political indoctrination alone was not enough and, often, it needed to be complemented by other more draconian measures.9

  During that time, the NVA, however, continued to tighten their grip around the besieged city. Taking advantage of their new gains in the northern half of the city, the NVA installed anti-aircraft weapons on the roof of high-rise buildings to shoot at incoming aircraft in an effort to prevent resupply and medical evacuation.

  Although most of these anti-aircraft positions were quickly destroyed by U.S. warplanes, the aggressive use of anti-aircraft assets indicated that the enemy was determined to isolate An Loc at all costs. Having paid an exorbitant price in terms of human lives, the enemy was now trying to complement its military campaign by a combination of physical strangulation tactics and—and as we will see later—psychological warfare and propaganda.

  On April 21, the 36th Ranger Battalion, in an effort to enlarge its area of control in the northeastern sector, directed the 4th Company to recapture the building just in front of its eastern defense line. A four-man raiding team succeeded in entering the building after having killed nine NVA soldiers in and around the building. Two rangers were wounded during the close combat inside the house. Second Lieutenant Nam, deputy company commander, took a few men to go to the rescue of the raiding team. The NCO radioman was killed by a hand grenade thrown from the roof of the building. Lieutenant Quan, the company commander, leading the company reserve, went to the rescue of Lieutenant Nam. He personally killed two NVA soldiers, but was wounded in the leg. He was evacuated four days later by a helicopter that landed on the helipad in the Airborne Brigade area. As the helicopter took off, it received two rounds of AK47 which missed Quan by a few inches. The good news was that the area of control of the 36th Battalion was expanded 200 meters eastward after the 4th Company’s raid.10<
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  A few days later, one night, under cover of darkness, Major Lac, the 36th Battalion commander, his assistant S-3, and a radio operator, crawled into a destroyed enemy tank stuck in a bomb crater in the middle of the street in the vicinity of the Chinese High School to search the interior of the tank. Lac was a good soldier and a multi-talented man: he knew how to repair a jeep or a truck, or a radio set. He also knew how to fly a helicopter. An officer in the 3rd Ranger Group staff reported that every time his battalion conducted a helicopter assault, Lac would personally fly the command ship to direct the landing operation.

  Inside the disabled tank, Lac found important military and communication documents. He also dismantled a radio set to bring back with him. However, when the three men climbed out of the bomb crater, they were pinned down by heavy enemy fire from across the street. Lac called the Group headquarters to request air support. The 5th Division informed the rangers that the Spectre that was supporting other units had just completed its mission and had returned to its base and that the only thing available was a Stinger, which was on its way to the area. Like the AC-130 Spectre, the AC-119 Stinger gunship flew both day and night and was particularly effective at night. It flew at an operational altitude of 3,500 feet above Loc Ninh and An Loc, and its 7.62mm miniguns and 20mm cannon were very accurate.11 The tracer bullets flashing through the night sky looked like fire gushing out from the mouth of the dragon, and for this reason, the South Vietnamese defenders called the Stinger Rong Lua or “Fire Dragon.”

  The FAC that was working above An Loc was guided to the target area by the Ranger Group staff and the American advisors, who asked it to fire white smoke twenty meters north-northeast of the tank. Following a small adjustment transmitted by Major Lac, the Stinger began firing at the identified target. After an hour of uninterrupted firing, the enemy must have been all killed because they no longer fired at Lac and his party. The three men crawled out of the bomb crater with their captured booty. Colonel Biet was shocked when he looked at the documents taken from the enemy tank: among them was the secret radio code of the 5th Division.12