Hell in An Loc Page 14
According to a report published on August 15, 1973, by ARVN Joint General Staff, the average success rate of parachute dropping during the entire siege of An Loc was about one-third: Out of a total of 3,868 tons of supplies dropped into An Loc, only 1,138 tons had been recovered. The balance was lost to the enemy or was damaged.
Seven
Reinforcing An Loc
While the war was raging at Loc Ninh, General Minh, III Corps commander, finally realizing that Binh Long—and not Tay Ninh—was the main objective of the enemy’s 1972 Easter Offensive, ordered the 43rd Regiment of the 18th Division, reinforced with the 5th Armored Squadron, to secure Route 13 north of Lai Khe. The relief column received 130mm artillery fire but met only light enemy resistance. It arrived at Chon Thanh without incident on April 7.
The next day, the column was subjected to an intense artillery barrage and engaged by a regiment-size enemy blocking force south of Tao O creek. The enemy, well protected by an intricate system of underground inter-connecting reinforced bunkers, stopped the 43rd Regiment’s progression despite powerful artillery and tactical air support. The death of Col. Truong Huu Duc, the 5th Armored Squadron commander, during an aerial inspection of the battle of Tao O caused the attack to lose momentum and the 43rd Regiment—which suffered 30% losses—to withdraw out of the enemy artillery range and reorganize.1
After the war council meeting in Saigon on April 7 decided to put the 21st Dìvision and the 1st Airborne Brigade under the operational control of III Corps in order to cope with the NVA/VC offensive in Binh Long province, General Minh decided to use both of these units to attack from the south to secure the vital supply line to An Loc and to link up with the besieged city. Minh resisted the idea of transporting the 1st Airborne Brigade directly into An Loc to reinforce the garrison because he was concerned that NVA forces could bypass An Loc and attack the cities to the south and thus would pose a serious threat to Saigon itself.
In fact, the NVA had the capability to unleash two uncommitted independent regiments, the 24th and 274th, against elements of the ARVN 25th Division in Tay Ninh province. These two regiments, which had not been engaged in the battle of An Loc, could then join forces with elements of the 7th Division or even the 5th Division after the latter’s victory at Loc Ninh, to attack Hau Nghia province south of Tay Ninh and to open a new front to support the enemy’s planned drive toward the capital of South Viet Nam.
On the morning of April 11, the 1st Airborne Brigade under Col. Le Van Luong, was transported by trucks from Lai Khe to Chon Thanh in order to replace the 43rd Regiment in the Route 13 securing mission. The paratroopers disembarked at Chon Thanh and then moved north by foot. They were stopped just six kilometers north of Chon Thanh by a well-entrenched blocking force made up of a regiment of NVA’s 7th Division. The paratroopers were unable to destroy the enemy blocking positions due to the lack of support from attached armor units of the 5th Armored Squadron; the latter were reluctant to move forward after having suffered heavy losses from enemy mortar and rocket barrages.2
Meanwhile, the situation in An Loc became critical after the second attack. The 5th Division had practically given up one-third of the city to the north. The enemy had occupied the airfield and installed a powerful anti-aircraft system around the city, which had not only thwarted medical evacuation efforts, but had also taken a heavy toll on the aircraft and crews carrying out aerial resupply missions.
Faced with the possible collapse of the garrison under renewed enemy attacks, General Minh met on April 14 in Lai Khe with Lt. Gen. Duong Quoc Dong, the Airborne Division commander, and Colonel Luong, to discuss the feasibility of conducting an air assault into An Loc to reinforce the defense of the city. During that meeting, Minh informed General Dong and Colonel Luong that the NVA troops were tightening their knots around An Loc, that the friendly casualties kept mounting due to increased enemy artillery fire and that an advance base must be established in the vicinity of An Loc to provide fire support to the defenders and to allow fresh troops to link up with and reinforce the threatened garrison. According to General Minh, the 1st Airborne Brigade was the most suitable unit to carry out that difficult mission.3
The 1st Airborne Brigade was the offshoot of the former 1st Airborne Group. When the Airborne Division was formed in 1966 to serve as the backbone of the ARVN general reserve, the 1st Airborne Group became the 1st Airborne Brigade. It was the oldest and most experienced brigade of the Airborne Division, having participated in major operations of the Viet Nam War, including the battles to liberate Hue and Saigon during the 1968 Tet Offensive, and the invasion of Low Laos in February 1971.
Colonel Luong had graduated from the Thu Duc Reserve Officers School in 1954. He rose through the ranks and assumed command of the 1st Brigade in early 1968. Luong, who was born and raised in Binh Duong province, knew the region well, and thus was the ideal man to lead the rescue mission.
It was decided in that meeting that the 1st Airborne Brigade would be heliborne into a LZ in the vicinity of Doi Gio (Windy) Hill about four kilometers southeast of An Loc. The brigade would establish a fire support base in the Doi Gio-Hill 169 area, and the rest of the paratroopers would attack west to link up with the defenders inside An Loc. The 21st Division units that had extracted themselves without incident from their operations in An Xuyen province in the Mekong Delta, would relieve the 1st Airborne Brigade and would be responsible for securing Route 13.
General Minh, however, was concerned about the reported presence of NVA Regiment 165 in the Xa Cam-Xa Trach area, southeast of An Loc and Regiment 141 in the vicinity of Ap Soc Gon, east of An Loc. In General Minh’s view, the above regiments from the NVA 7th Division—which were located within four kilometers from Doi Gio area—would pose a serious threat to the planned heliborne operation of the 1st Airborne Brigade. So, on April 13, while the NVA was launching their first attack on An Loc, Minh instructed his assistant for operations, Lt. Col. Nguyen Ngoc Anh, to attend the daily ARVN press conference—organized by the Psychological Warfare Department in Saigon to brief foreign reporters on the important military news of the day—with specific instructions aimed at disguising the planned landing of the paratroopers at Doi Gio the following day.4
Lieutenant Colonel Anh later reported that he began his presentation with a description of the tactical situation in An Loc at the end of the first day of the attack; then, he disclosed that one wounded North Vietnamese soldier captured by the 36th Ranger Battalion on April 11 revealed that VC Gen. Tran Van Tra, commander of the Nguyen Hue campaign in MRIII, along with his staff and key members of COSVN, had moved to Quan Loi airport to direct the attack on An Loc. Anh added that III Corps had requested ARVN/JGS to immediately drop the 81st Airborne Commando Group in an area north of Quan Loi to capture Tran Van Tra and other COSVN members. In response to a question from a foreign correspondent regarding the timing of the 81st Commando airborne operation, Colonel Anh stated that it would take place during the early morning the following day. That night, the news of the dropping of the airborne commandos behind COSVN headquarters was disseminated by the world’s main broadcasting stations. Colonel Anh reported that Dr. Kissinger, who was negotiating the terms of the Peace Agreement in Paris, called to check out that news.5
In Colonel Anh’s view, General Minh’s misinformation scheme had worked because two Montagnards whom the 81st Airborne Commando Group met at the village of Soc Gon on April 16 reported that a substantial NVA force had hurriedly left the area without taking time to fill up the foxholes they had dug out a few days earlier.
Meanwhile, after the April 14 meeting at Lai Khe, Colonel Luong made an aerial reconnaissance of the Doi Gio-Hill 169 area. After carefully studying the landing zone, he decided to air-assault an area near Srok Ton Cui, a small Cambodian hamlet located approximately one kilometer east of Doi Gio and Hill 169. According to Colonel Luong’s plan, the 6th Airborne Battalion would land first to clear the LZ. The following day, the fifteenth of April, the 5th and 8th Battalions with the brigade
headquarters would land in the same area. Upon completion of the heliborne operation, the 5th and 8th Battalions would move toward An Loc in two columns. The 6th Battalion would establish a fire support base in the Doi Gio-Hill 169 area. In anticipation of NVA counter-attacks after landing, the 1st Airborne Brigade units had received two days before the planed heliborne operation the new rocket launcher XM-202—a modified version of the old M-72 that could fire four rockets at a maximum range of 750 meters, producing a great psychological effect, and inflicting casualties on personnel in bunkers, buildings, and covered or open foxholes.6
At 2:30 P.M. on April 14, the 60th Company of the 6th Airborne Battalion landed in a clearing near Community Road 245, approximately one kilometer south of Srok Ton Cui hamlet. After their landing, the men from 60th Company could see to the west An Loc burning with huge columns of black smoke. A few minutes later, Lt. Col. Nguyen Van Dinh, battalion commander, landed with his staff and the 61st Airborne Company. Colonel Dinh ordered Maj. Pham Kim Bang, battalion executive, to attack an enemy outpost on Doi Gio with 63rd Company (Lt. Vinh) and 64th Company (Lt. Tuan). The only usable 105mm howitzer in An Loc provided fire support for the attack. Lieutenants Tuan and Vinh led the respective companies in the uphill assault. Doi Gio, occupied by a small VC unit, was easily overwhelmed after thirty minutes of close-range combat.7
At 4:30 P.M., the enemy began massing artillery fire on the landing zone, causing moderate casualties to the 6th Battalion. On Hill 169, the 6th Airborne Battalion linked up with the 3rd Ranger Company from the 52nd Ranger Battalion, which had been occupying this high ground as an outpost for the defense of An Loc.
The news of the landing of the paratroopers at Doi Gio galvanized the spirits of the garrison and of the civilian population as well. It is noteworthy that, following the French tradition, every arm and branch of the ARVN had a patron saint: Vietnamese paratroopers adopted the Archangel Michael as their patron. Like the Archangel Michael, who was brave and who chased the evil from the heavens, the paratroopers were the bravest soldiers of the armed forces and were committed to chasing the VC from the Republic. Because the paratroopers descended from the sky to fight the enemy, they were dubbed “thien than mu do” (red-bereted angels), by an admiring civilian population.
Map 10: Paratroopers Heliborne Operations
On April 15, all units of the 1st Airborne Brigade were brought into the landing zone without incident. The landing operation was performed by the Bien Hoa-based 43rd Helicoper Squadron/3rd Air Division, under the supervision of Maj. Nguyen Van Uc, who was responsible for all landing operations and medical evacuations for the battle of An Loc. However, while the landing of the paratroopers was relatively smooth, the Chinook helicopters from VNAF 237th Squadron, which hooked eight 105mm howitzers into Doi Gio, came under enemy artillery fire and were able to bring in only the first six guns; the last two helicopters were hit by anti-aircraft fire and had to return to Lai Khe.8 Colonel Luong decided to leave on Doi Gio and Hill 169, in addition to the artillery battery, the 6th Airborne Battalion, the 3rd Reconnaissance Company, one engineer company, and a Light Brigade headquarters under Lt. Col. Le Van Ngoc. These units were to secure the above two hills and provide artillery support to the airborne brigade in An Loc. They were also to provide an alternate command headquarters and communication center for the paratroopers.
In accordance with the operation plan, the paratroopers moved into An Loc in two columns. The column to the south, consisting of the 8th Battalion, the 3rd Ranger Company from the 52nd Ranger Battalion, and the 254th RF Company (that the paratroopers had met on Hill 169 two days earlier), under the overall command of Lt. Col. Van Ba Ninh, entered the city of An Loc at 7:00 A.M. April 17 without incident. However, the ranger company commander was seriously wounded during an engagement with NVA forces. He could not be evacuated and died a few days later in An Loc.9
The column to the north including the 5th Battalion (Lt. Col. Nguyen Chi Hieu) and the brigade headquarters had less success. It had to cross a dense rubber plantation to reach Soc Gon hamlet. On April 16 at 9:30 A.M., as it reached a small hill between Soc Gon and Phu Hoa hamlets, it was attacked by one regiment of the NVA 5th Division. According to a captured prisoner, the 5th Division had to move full speed from Loc Ninh to An Loc to reinforce the 9th Division, which had incurred heavy casualties during the attack on An Loc three days earlier.10
The 51st Company, the lead company of the 5th Battalion, was attacked by one enemy battalion; after two hours of engagement, the enemy started to deploy in a U formation in an effort to encircle and annihilate the paratroopers. Fortunately, the U.S. lieutenant from the 5th Airborne advisory team was able to contact a U.S. FAC, which directed U.S tactical air on the enemy only 200 meters in front of the paratroopers. Second Lt. Vu Van Hoi, a recent graduate of the Vietnamese Military Academy and a platoon leader in the 51st Company, reported that one bomb released by one of the U.S. jet fighters instantly transformed a portion of the rubber plantation into a soccer field-sized barren lot. Hoi was deafened by the shock and had to pinch himself in the leg to be sure he was still alive. The FAC reported the enemy battalion was totally destroyed and that twisted crew-served weapons, including mortars, were lying all around amidst charred and mangled bodies. Hoi saw in front of him about forty enemy dead with all sorts of broken and twisted weapons. In the meantime, two B-52 strikes hit a target farther west. Hoi believed they probably had hit the headquarters of an enemy regiment because after the strike, the battle suddenly became eerily silent and he could even hear the “sounds of the crickets.”11
However, at 12:00 noon, the enemy launched a second assault, this time supported by elements of a tank company. Again, the 5th Airborne vigorously crushed the multiple human wave assaults and destroyed all the accompanying tanks.
The outcome of these two attacks reflected the intensity of the fighting. In addition to the destroyed tanks, the enemy suffered 85 KIA; 7 crew-served weapons and 20 AK-47s were captured. Friendly: 3 KIA, 13 wounded.12
In these engagements, the 5th Battalion was supported by tactical air requested by the U.S. advisors. After the column was resupplied and the killed and wounded evacuated by helicopters, it camped for the night on the slope of a small hill one kilometer to the north of the engagement site. That night, two enemy commandos trying to infiltrate into the paratroopers lines were shot and killed.
At 5:30 A.M. on April 17, the enemy massed artillery fire on the 5th Battalion from the north, northwest, and south. After the artillery stopped, the enemy again launched the all-too familiar human wave assaults. This time, the 5th Airborne Battalion again held out and inflicted heavy casualties on the attackers. The enemy left 30 bodies; 6 crew-served weapons (including a 12.7mm anti-aircraft machinegun) and 5 individual weapons were captured. The paratroopers suffered 5 KIA and 17 wounded, including Maj. Le Hong, the battalion executive.13
After the attack was repulsed, the paratroopers continued their march toward An Loc. At 10:00 A.M., when they reached the rail track near Quan Loi Gate, the paratroopers were stopped by small enemy units well entrenched in their foxholes. These foxholes were dug out by the people to protect against enemy artillery. When the NVA launched their first attacks, the people fled their hamlets to seek refuge inside the city; now the enemy was using these foxholes to stop the paratroopers from reinforcing the garrison. The paratroopers had to resort to hand grenades and close combat techniques to destroy the enemy nets of resistance one by one, despite sporadic artillery fire directed by enemy observation posts on the high ground to the north.
After two hours of bloody close-quarters combat, the paratroopers destroyed all enemy blocking positions and around noon, the first elements of the 5th Battalion entered An Loc. Lieutenant Hoi’s platoon was ordered to coordinate with the 5th Reconnaissance Company, 5th Division, for the defense of the Binh Long Sector Hospital and the Health Department Office area, which was facing the enemy just across from Tran Hung Dao Boulevard. Hoi later recalled that his platoon had to fig
ht off enemy attacks and at the same time perform mass burials of dead civilians and soldiers piling up inside the hospital.
According to Hoi, food and water were in critically short supply. All buffaloes, cows, pigs, chickens, even cats and rats, were nowhere to be found. All the wells in the city, including the ten meter-deep ones, had dried up, and his men had to scrape together whatever was left to distribute to friendly units and also to the civilians. One of his men was killed by an artillery shell while drawing water from a nearby well; his body fell into the well and had to be pulled out to be buried behind the hospital.14 Lt. Truong Dang Si, 51st Company, 5th Airborne Battalion, was seriously wounded by shrapnel in the neck on April 17 and was evacuated to Saigon by one of the helicopters transporting the last elements of the 81st Airborne Commando into An Loc.15(Si was one of the three company commanders of the 5th Battalion wounded at An Loc; the battalion executive officer was also wounded during the siege.)16
The problem of water shortage was alleviated in early May with the first seasonal rains. Dr. Nguyen Van Quy, the surgeon at Binh Long Sector Hospital, recalled that the first rain falling on An Loc was an unusually big storm; and although the rain water was darkened by embers from smoldering buildings, the elated soldiers as well as the civilians emerged from their foxholes and hiding places to take showers and to clean up their fatigue uniforms or clothing. Dr. Quy also took advantage of this first rain to clean up his heavily damaged hospital and to get rid of the persistent stench of decomposed bodies.