Hell in An Loc Page 16

  In the south, an element of the 9th Division launched a probing attack on the 5th Airborne Battalion’s positions southeast of Xa Cam Gate. The 5th Battalion suffered six KIA and twenty-one wounded. The enemy left thirty-five bodies. The 5th Battalion captured six crew-served and six individual weapons.33

  While the situation in An Loc was temporarily under control, the paratroopers at Doi Gio Hill and Hill 169 were fighting for their lives. Concurrent with the attacks on An Loc by elements of the 9th Division, on April 19 the 275th Regiment of the 5th Division and the 141st Regiment of the 7th Division were unleashed against the paratroopers defending the strategic high ground southeast of the city. Because all artillery pieces inside An Loc and at Quan Loi airport had been damaged or destroyed by NVA’s attacks and counter-battery barrages, the airborne battery on Doi Gio Hill was the only one available for close fire support to the besieged city; and the enemy was determined to knock out this last ARVN artillery outfit around An Loc.

  Again, following their usual tactic of tien phao hau xung, the attack was preceded by an intense artillery preparation on Doi Gio Hill. The 105mm artillery battery on Doi Gio was completely neutralized; the artillery ammunition depot containing over 1,000 shells was hit and exploded. Around 9:00 P.M., Colonel Luong, the 1st Airborne Brigade commander, gave complete authority to Lt. Col. Le Van Ngoc, his deputy in charge of the Light Brigade headquarters, to take appropriate decisions to deal with the situation around Doi Gio. Ngoc ordered the 6th Battalion headquarters and the 62nd Company to reinforce the 61st Company at Srok Ton Cui hamlet. The 63rd and 64th Companies, under Maj. Pham Kim Bang, executive officer, were assigned the task of defending Doi Gio.

  After the NVA had lifted their artillery preparation, an enemy unit supported by tanks attacked Doi Gio from the north and northeast. Second Lt. Tran Dai Chien, a recent graduate of the Vietnamese Military Academy, opened fire when the enemy tanks were within a fifty-meter range The first two tanks were hit and exploded; the enemy infantry ran down the hill in panic. The enemy resumed artillery fire on Doi Gio, then assaulted the paratroopers’ positions with a new infantry unit supported by two remaining tanks. The paratroopers destroyed these last two tanks but had to disperse under heavy enemy pressure. Chien, severely wounded by an artillery shell and unable to move, decided to stay at his position; he ordered his platoon to withdraw without him. When the enemy overran Doi Gio, Chien threw his last grenade toward them; he died under a hail of enemy bullets. Chien’s father had served in the 1st Division; his older brother, a battalion commander, also in the 1st Division, was killed in Quang Tri. Although he was entitled to a draft deferment, Chien enrolled in the Vietnamese Military Academy and like many top graduates, he chose to serve in the Airborne Division upon graduation in December 1971.34

  The survivors of 63rd and 64th Companies withdrew to Hill 169, which was occupied by the 1st Airborne Light Brigade headquarters and the 3rd Reconnaissance Company. The enemy started to shift their artillery fire to Hill 169. Judging the situation on Hill 169 untenable, Colonel Luong ordered Ngoc to withdraw to An Loc with the remnant units of the brigade. The reconnaissance and engineer companies and the 63rd Company from the 6th Battalion, in conjunction with individual soldiers from other units, followed the previous itinerary of the 8th Battalion and arrived at An Loc on the morning of April 21.

  The situation of the 6th Battalion was more critical. The battalion headquarters and what remained of the 60th, 61st, 62nd, and 64th companies, ran out of food and ammunition. Burdened with sixty wounded soldiers, they were still trapped in Srok Ton Cui hamlet. During the night of April 20, they withdrew toward Song Be to the southeast to be extracted by helicopters. Three B-52 missions were executed in support of the extraction operation. The paratroopers were attacked by the enemy many times during their withdrawal and also at the preplanned extraction point. Only 106 men, including Lt. Col. Nguyen Van Dinh, the battalion commander, and 14 artillerymen were picked up by helicopters and transported to Lai Khe.35 Later, small groups of survivors and stragglers were able to stream back for several days into friendly lines at An Loc and further south at Chon Thanh and Lai Khe. The 6th Battalion, minus the 63rd Company, was reorganized and replenished at Lai Khe pending further deployment.

  The fall of Doi Gio and Hill 169, which secured the landing zone, dealt a heavy blow to the morale of the troops in An Loc. The last link to the outside world was effectively removed and from then on the city was completely sealed off. The only artillery unit available for close support had been destroyed. The NVA now controlled all the high ground to the southeast and from there they were able to direct deadly artillery fire into An Loc.

  On the other hand, however, the arrival of the 1st Airborne Brigade and the 81st Airborne Commando Group, the two elite units of the South Vietnamese army, had galvanized the garrison as well as the civilian population and reinforced their confidence in the final outcome of the battle of An Loc. Colonel Miller, who had the highest praise for the above units, later commented that “we were home free; with the 81st inside and the airborne outside, there was no way we would go down.”36 Captured NVA prisoners admitted that they were mostly afraid of three things: B-52 strikes, “Commandos number 81,” and paratroopers. Unfortunately for them, all these three things were present at An Loc.

  Due to mounting civilian casualties caused by uninterrupted shelling, the International Red Cross, on April 20, asked for a twenty-four-hour cease-fire so that the wounded could be evacuated, but the Communists, intent to take the city at all costs, refused the Red Cross’ request. Madame Nguyen Thi Binh, chief VC negotiator in Paris, declared that no truce was possible and that the offensive must go on. In fact, the enemy hoped that the rapidly mounting death toll combined with the critical shortage of basic needs would sap the morale of the defenders and force the surrender of the garrison in accordance with their strangulation tactic.

  In the early morning of April 21, the enemy intensified their shelling of An Loc, focusing in particular on the southern sector held by the 1st Airborne Brigade. During the night of April 22, NVA troops assaulted the position of the 8th Airborne Battalion in the vicinity of the Southern Gate. The attacking troops were supported by two T-54 and two PT-76 tanks. This time, the paratroopers were ready. Armed with the new antitank weapon XM-202, the soldiers of the 8th Airborne Battalion destroyed all four enemy tanks. The paratroopers were also able to guide a C-130 Spectre to a column of five enemy tanks approaching from the south. All the tanks were destroyed.37

  In the meantime, a column of three tanks attacked the position of the 5th Battalion in the southwestern sector. Second Lieutenant Hoi from the 51st Company, recalled that three T-54 tanks rolled directly into his position without infantry protection. Hoi directed his men to take position in the trenches behind the barbed wire and to aim their M-72s at the approaching tanks. (His 32-man platoon was equipped with 16 M-72 LAWs, one XM-202 antitank weapon, and 16 claymore mines.) Hoi fired his XM-202 weapon and set the lead T-54 afire; the two remaining tanks were finished off by his men.38

  During the night of April 30, the NVA renewed the offensive in an effort to take the capital city of Binh Long to celebrate the May 1 Labor Day. NVA troops launched violent assaults on ARVN positions on the northern and western sectors after a powerful artillery and 122mm rocket preparation. The fighting lasted the entire morning of May 1. Around 11:00 A.M., the enemy withdrew, but the front-line battalions reported heavy concentrations of NVA troops on the edge of the rubber plantations about two kilometers west of the defense perimeter. Colonel Truong, 8th Regiment commander, called General Hung and requested tactical air support. General Hung told him six A-37 sorties were on the way to An Loc and he should contact the orbiting FAC to identify the targets. The air strikes were accurate but they didn’t stop the enemy. Truong called General Hung again and reported that the enemy was preparing to launch a human wave assault; he also requested napalm bombs on Hill 100 northwest of An Loc. Lt. Col. Ly Duc Quan, 7th Regiment commander, also request
ed air strikes on a target west of Phu Lo Gate.

  At that time, the two battalion commanders of the 8th Regiment on the frontline called on the telephone and reported that their 81mm mortars were unable to stop the advancing NVA troops. They urgently requested napalm bombs. Suddenly, Colonel Truong noticed an eerie silence in the sky; even the FAC that was orbiting over An Loc had disappeared. A few seconds later, Truong heard the frightening whistles of the big bombs falling from high above, followed by a chain of earth-shaking explosions on the targets requested by the 7th and 8th Regiments, only one kilometer from ARVN positions. A big cloud of red dust rose up and covered the entire northwestern sky.

  General Hung called and asked Truong to observe the targets and report the results of the B-52 strikes. After the dust had settled, Truong scrutinized the western horizon and saw no enemy standing. Hung later told Colonel Truong—who was wondering how on earth an Arc Light strike could be requested in just thirty minutes—that his regiment had just been saved by three God-sent B-52 missions. He went on to explain that these missions had been requested by II Corps, but when the B-52 bombers were approaching the Vietnamese coast, II Corps cancelled the missions. MACV asked III Corps if it had any good targets for these B-52s. As the 5th Division was requesting urgent tactical air, it was decided to divert these Arc Light missions to support the defenders of An Loc.39

  While the An Loc garrison had thwarted the enemy attempt to take the city to celebrate the Labor Day, the Quang Tri garrison was not so lucky. Despite a heroic defense by the 3rd Division and attached units, casualties began to mount and on May 1, NVA divisions, spearheaded by armored units, crossed the Thach Han River and encircled the 3rd Division inside the Citadel. Under pressure and unable to control all his organic and attached units, General Giai, judging the situation hopeless, ordered the evacuation of the Citadel and withdrew his troops to the next defense line south of My Chanh River, which was defended by the Airborne Division (-) and one Marine brigade.

  The fall of Quang Tri jolted the country and was a harbinger for somber days ahead, but in An Loc, General Hung and his unit commanders were grappling with more pressing problems: not only had they to prepare for anticipated enemy renewed attacks, but they also had to cope with the daunting challenge of an orderly collection and distribution of the scarce supplies that were air dropped daily into the encircled garrison: with the increasing influx of refugees from surrounding areas seeking “safe haven” in the city, food, water and medical supplies became alarmingly in short supply. Every time there was an air drop at the city soccer field, soldiers from various units fought for the few recoverable packages. Food was also in short supply at An Loc Hospital and Colonel Miller reported that he saw hospital patients, including amputees, struggling with soldiers to recover food for themselves.40

  To deal with this chaotic situation, the 5th Division directed Col. Bui Duc Diem, Assistant for Operations, in coordination with Maj. Nguyen Dinh The, Sector Chief of Staff, and Maj.Nguyen Kim Diem, Sector S4, to assume the responsibility for the recovering, processing and distribution of the supplies to various units in the garrison as well as to the civilian population.41 However, as the enemy was shelling the soccer field after each drop to destroy the supplies, and as the recovering team was waiting for the cessation of the shelling, many soldiers braved the artillery fire to grab the dropped packages. Colonel Diem reported that one day as he was “escorting” Colonel Miller to watch parachute drops under the new HALO technique, enemy artillery started to fire on the soccer field. Colonel Diem pushed Colonel Miller into a nearby bunker while he stayed outside to supervise the recovery operation. His radioman carrying a PCR-25 radio set was killed by shrapnel from an artillery shell and a soldier was crushed to death by an errant pallet.42The Ranger Group also reported two casualties from the air drops: A warrant officer from the 36th Battalion was also crushed to death by a pallet and an American sergeant in the advisory team was wounded in the head by another.43

  General Hung finally asked Colonel Luong, the airborne brigade commander, to take charge of the recovery and distribution operations. Luong and his no-nonsense paratroopers quickly reestablished order and the supply operation proceeded without incident. The improved accuracy of parachute drops and the more efficient distribution of supplies greatly improved the logistical situation within the garrison. A U.S. advisor with the 5th Division recalled that the successful drops “had almost an indefinable impact in raising the ARVN defenders’ morale, giving them hope and raising them from a total situation of frustration to one of confidence.”44

  Special credit should be given to the officers and men of the USAF who braved intense anti-aircraft fire to resupply An Loc. From mid-April to mid-May, 5 C-130s were shot down, 56 aircraft were hit, 17 crew members were killed or missing in action, and another 10 were wounded.45

  In the beginning of May, the situation in An Loc had greatly improved. The enemy continued to shell An Loc, but most of the fire was from mortars. This lull in the shelling had allowed a few helicopters to land and pick up the most seriously wounded. The normalization of the aerial resupply operations, the limited success of medical evacuation, and the ability of the defenders to hold their ground in face of two major attacks had bolstered the confidence of the garrison. The defenders also took advantage of the break after the failed second attack to consolidate and reinforce their positions.

  Although the constant flow of refugees added to the logistical problems for the city, they provided, on the other hand, invaluable information on the enemy. The ethnic Montagnards, in particular, were an excellent source of information: because they didn’t attract the attention of the North Vietnamese, the Montagnards were able to move around more freely and thus provided reliable details on enemy activities. Some members of the Provincial Reconnaissance teams, disguised as Montagnards wandering by mistake into enemy lines or pretending to be pursued by South Vietnamese soldiers, later came back and reported what they had observed or heard. Capt. Nguyen Van Thiet, Sector S2, and Capt. Le Van Dao from the province’s Phoenix committee, skillfully exploited the above sources of information to determine the locations of the enemy assembly areas, logistical installations, artillery sites, and tank formations.46 The destruction of identified enemy targets by B-52 strikes and tactical air undoubtedly impacted the enemy offensive capabilities as they were preparing for yet another assault on An Loc.

  Eight

  The Third Attack on An Loc

  In early May, intelligence reports confirmed that two regiments of the NVA 5th Division, the E6 and the 174th, had moved from their location south of Loc Ninh to the Doi Gio-Hill 169 area southeast of An Loc. This area was abandoned by the 1st Airborne Brigade after the 6th Battalion was overrun by superior NVA forces on April 20. There were also reports that elements of the 9th Division were occupying new positions southwest of the city and the 141st and 165th Regiments of the 7th Division had moved from their blocking positions in the vicinity of Tau O on Route 13 to an area just three kilometers south of An Loc.

  During the night of May 5, the enemy launched a probing attack on the 81st Commando Group positions. The fighting lasted until dawn. The enemy left many dead on the barbed wire on the defense perimeter. In the pocket of each dead body the commandos found a small piece of paper inscribed with the following words: “At all costs, capture the 5th Division commander alive, raise the flag of victory.”1

  The night of May 6, the 212th Binh Long RF Company captured a North Vietnamese warrant officer during an ambush near Quan Loi Gate on the eastern perimeter of An Loc. His name was Nguyen The Hoa. His unit was the 228th Sapper Battalion of the NVA 5th Division. Hoa’s mission was to reconnoiter the above area in preparation for the upcoming attack. He didn’t know the exact date of the new attack, but guessed it would be within a week. The prisoner also disclosed that on April 20 and 21, COSVN officials had made an assessment of their failure to take An Loc. During the above critique session, the NVA leaders had castigated the 9th Division for its poor sho
wing. They also decided that the leading role for the next attack would be assigned to the 5th Division, which would be reinforced by elements of the 9th Division and tank units.2 The NVA 5th Division commander promised he would replicate what he did in Loc Ninh and take An Loc in two days.3

  Based on these new indicators, General Minh and his advisor, General Hollingsworth, agreed that a new NVA assault was in the making and that increased Arc Light missions were needed to thwart the enemy plan. At General Hollingsworth’s request, General Abrams agreed to allocate to III Corps a full twenty-four hours of B-52 strikes. Since a total of twenty-five B-52 strikes had been made available to him on April 10, General Hollingsworth called General Abrams and told him he wanted one B-52 strike every fifty-five minutes for the next twenty-five hours, effective 5:30 A.M. on May 11, the expected date of the new NVA offensive.4