Hell in An Loc Read online

  Every time he awarded decorations to soldiers who had distinguished themselves in battle, Dao never failed to give them a small envelope containing some cash and a lighter on which were engraved the words “Present from the 18th Division Commander.” By all accounts, Dao’s genuine concern for the welfare of his men had earned him their loyalty and respect.

  The 18th Division was one of the youngest ARVN divisions. Created in 1963—first as the ARVN 10th Division—it consisted of three independent regiments: 43rd, 48th, and 52nd. The 10th Division became the 18th Division in 1967 because the number “10” was considered an unlucky number (as opposed to the number “9” or any multiple of that number).

  From 1965 to 1969, the 18th Division was responsible for the 33rd Tactical Area consisting of the provinces of Bien Hoa, Long Khanh, Phuoc Tuy, Binh Tuy, and the Special Vung Tau Sector. In 1970, the 18th Division became a mobile force operating throughout MRIII. In the early months of that year, the 18th had participated in the III Corps-directed invasion of Cambodia; during that incursion, it had destroyed many COSVN secret bases after heavy engagements with the NVA forces in Chup, Pean Chaeng, Suong, Damber, Kandaol Chrum, and Phum Khuar.

  Colonel Dao assumed the command of the 18th Division toward the end of March 1972, just two weeks before the NVA launched their Easter Offensive. In April 1972, while the garrison of An Loc was fighting for its life, Dao was busy fighting VC independent regiments and provincial units in Binh Duong and Phuoc Tuy provinces with the 43rd and the 48th Regiments. (The 52nd Regiment, which had been attached to the 5th Division and had suffered heavy losses during the battle of Loc Ninh, was being refurbished and reorganized in An Loc.)

  The Communists’ plan in MRIII at that time was to create a diversion in the north by attacking the border outposts in Tay Ninh province and to pin down the 18th Division in the south to prevent it from reinforcing An Loc by attacking ARVN bases in Binh Duong, Hau Nghia, and Phuoc Tuy provinces. In April 24, the 43rd Regiment of the 18th Division battled the VC independent 101st Regiment in Cha Ray and Trung Lap in Binh Duong province, killing a total of 321 enemies in five days of intense fighting.2 During the same time, the Communists opened a new front in Phuoc Tuy province by attacking the district of Dat Do and occupying many hamlets of the district of Long Dien. Colonel Dao used the 48th Regiment and Phuoc Tuy territorial forces to engage the VC independent 274th Regiment and the provincial 445th Battalion. The enemy withdrew with heavy losses after a few days of combat.

  Toward the end of June, as the situation in An Loc had considerably improved, III Corps ordered the remainder of the 18th Division to the city to replace the exhausted 5th Division. (By that time, the 48th and 52nd Regiments were already in An Loc.) It took Dao two weeks to assemble the remnant units of his division and to transport them by helicopters into An Loc. When the first elements of the division arrived on July 11, the entire city had been retaken by friendly forces, but the enemy still held the strategic Doi Gio-Hill 169 southeast of An Loc, the Quan Loi airport, and some important pockets of resistance outside the city, in particular in the southern area around Xa Cam hamlet. Furthermore, the NVA still occupied blocking positions in the vicinity of Tan Khai on Route 13, causing the 18th Division to rely mainly on VNAF for troop movements and resupply. (By the time the 18th Division moved to An Loc, the Vietnamization program was almost complete, but, according to General Dao, the small U.S. advisory team under Col. John Evans was still able to provide tactical air support and resupply missions.)3

  More important, the strategic district of Loc Ninh was still in enemy hands, as III Corps had no reserves to push north to retake the city. It is noteworthy that the same situation happened in MRI after the successful recapture of Quang Tri in September 1972. At that time, due to the fact the Airborne and the Marine Divisions were overextended and had suffered heavy losses, and JGS had run out of strategic reserves, the South Vietnamese army was unable to cross the Thach Han River to recapture the city of Dong Ha and the territory extending from the Thach Han to the Ben Hai River. The last river comprised the southern limit of the old DMZ as specified by the 1954 Geneva Accords.

  In the first few days after the 18th Division’s arrival, Colonel Dao ordered the 43rd Regiment to attack enemy positions south of An Loc in an effort to widen the division’s control area and eventually to link up with the town of Tan Khai. During that sweeping operation, the 2nd Battalion, 43rd Regiment, was ambushed and encircled by elements of the NVA 7th Division while operating five kilometers southwest of Xa Cam hamlet. The battalion held its lines and repulsed many enemy assaults, but Maj. Nguyen Van Thoai, the battalion commander, was killed during one of these assaults. Capt. Nguyen Huu Che, battalion executive, was finally able to extricate the battalion from the ambush site, thanks to the effective artillery protective fire and round-the-clock U.S. tactical air support, which created—in the words of Captain The—a “firewall” around his battalion position. The 2nd Battalion subsequently destroyed some of the NVA chot in its area of operation. In one of these encounters, the battalion captured about thirty weapons of all kinds abandoned on the terrain. Among the weapons captured was a piece of paper on which were hastily written the following words: “This is a present to you, we are going back North.”4

  The biggest problem facing the 18th Division, however, was that the enemy still controlled the high ground to the southeast—from which NVA observation posts still directed artillery fire into the city—and the strategic Quan Loi airport east of the city. Therefore, as soon as he had settled down at An Loc, brought in the division artillery, and consolidated the defense of the city, Colonel Dao ordered the recapture of the above two objectives in order to eliminate—or at least reduce—indirect enemy fire into the city and to increase the 18th Division’s tactical control area. According to Colonel Dao’s original plan, the 52nd Regiment and the 5th Ranger Group would be responsible for the defense of An Loc while the 48th Regiment and the 43rd Regiment would be assigned the mission of retaking the Doi Gio-Hill 169 area and the Quan Loi airport respectively.

  On July 17, the 3rd Battalion, 48th Regiment, was ordered to capture Hill 169. On the way to the objective, the 3rd Battalion saw many foxholes and bunkers that had been recently abandoned by the enemy. As the forward elements arrived at the edge of the rubber plantation facing Hill 169, the battalion came under heavy artillery fire from the northwest and 82mm mortar fire from the east. The soldiers had to take cover behind rubber trees to avoid being hit by shrapnel. Capt. Nguyen Phuc Song Huong, the battalion commander, requested counter-battery fire, but his request was denied because An Loc was running low on artillery ammunition. Huong readied his battalion for a probable enemy assault after they had lifted their artillery fire in accordance with their customary tien phao hau xung tactic, but the expected assault didn’t materialize; Huong inferred from the enemy’s inaction that they didn’t have any sizable unit left in the area.

  Captain Huong then went to the frontline to study the terrain. Hill 169 consisted of a central hilltop and two lower crests on its northwestern and southern sides. At the foot of Hill 169, the wreckage of a Skyraider and three helicopters testified to the viciousness of the battle for the control of this strategic high ground between the 1st Airborne Brigade and NVA forces three months earlier. To attack Hill 169, his men would have to cross open terrain covered with tall elephant grass and would thus present an easy target for the enemy’s 75mm recoilless rifles and machineguns. Huong was also concerned about a repeat of an earlier battle in Long Khanh province where his wounded soldiers were burned to death by elephant-grass fires caused by extensive summer heat and recoilless rifle fire. Consequently, he requested napalm bombs to burn the elephant grass, but was told by the regiment that they were not available and that he would be allocated, instead, two A-37 sorties to support the attack.

  While the A-37 fighters were circling the target, Captain Huong ordered two platoons, one from the 1st Company and the other from the 3rd Company, to speed across the clearing an
d establish a foothold at the foot of Hill 169. The A-37s dropped their bombs on the top of the hill, but the NVA, dug in on the northern and southern slopes, fired their B-40 and B-41 weapons on the two platoons from the 3rd Battalion. Captain Huong grew increasingly concerned about the fate of his platoons as the latter didn’t return fire, while the enemy rockets caused the elephant grass to burn and to engulf his men in a thick cloud of smoke. The platoon leaders finally reported two dead and five wounded but they had seized the stone bridge at the foot of Hill 169; they also requested reinforcements to expand their foothold.5

  Captain Huong ordered his Headquarters Company to stay in place and be ready to support the battalion’s attack with its two organic 81mm mortars. He then dashed across the burnt-out clearing with the rest of the battalion to assault Hill 169. The battalion, however, was pinned down in the open by heavy enemy recoilless rifle fire. Fortunately, Huong and his men were able to seek cover along small creeks originating from Hill 169. The radioman carrying the PCR-25 was killed at Huong’s side by rocket shrapnel. As the casualties kept mounting, Huong ordered his battalion to retreat toward the rubber plantation.

  Taking advantage of a big rainstorm that night, Captain Huong ordered a second attack. The 1st Company under Lieutenant Ly would seize the northwestern crest, the 3rd Company under Lieutenant Co would seize the southern crest, while the battalion headquarters and the two remaining companies would take care of the central hilltop. The battalion moved out in silence in the thick of the night and succeeded in reaching the hilltops undetected. The men from the 3rd Battalion simultaneously opened their fire and quickly overwhelmed the enemy who were sleeping in their bunkers and didn’t expect a night assault during a big storm.

  “They are on the top of the hill!” yelled the North Vietnamese soldiers who ran downhill in great panic.6

  Master Sergeant Be and his intelligence squad jumped into the enemy command bunker and seized the Communist Chinese central switchboard, killing the North Vietnamese soldiers who were calling for help. During the night, the enemy command post switchboard was taken to An Loc for intelligence gathering purposes; the wounded soldiers were also evacuated to the city for treatment.

  The 1st Company, however, reported that it was unable to progress to the top of the northern crest due to enemy recoilless rifles fire and that it was being attacked by enemy tanks moving uphill on the northern slope. Captain Huong requested air support. About half an hour later, a C-130 gunship arrived at the scene and started to strafe the enemy tanks. At the same time, the men from the 1st Company also fired their M-72s weapons at the approaching tanks and succeeded in stopping their attack. The NVA responded by firing their 120mm artillery on Hill 169 without interruption because they knew they had lost it to the 18th ARVN Division.

  The following day, the 1st Company launched another attack to capture the northern crest but was met with furious resistance. Captain Huong was shot in the leg by sniper fire while following the progress of the 1st Company. Huong was evacuated to Saigon and the attack on the last enemy positions on Hill 169 lost momentum.7

  On July 27, Lt. Col. Tran Ba Thanh, the 48th Regiment commander, decided it was time to take the remaining crest of Hill 169. He committed his reserves to attack this last North Vietnamese pocket of resistance. By 3:00 P.M., the enemy chot on the hill was eliminated; the only survivor raised his hands to surrender.8

  The 48th Regiment’s next objective was Doi Gio (Windy Hill). With an altitude of 150 meters, Doi Gio was located in a very difficult and dangerous terrain. Its name reportedly came from the nightly howling of the winds that reverberated through the neighboring thick rubber plantations. The relatively steep eastern and western slopes of Doi Gio made any attack from these directions a risky endeavor. The northern and northeastern slopes were more gradual but the enemy had good fields of fire in these directions. Furthermore, the 6th Airborne Battalion and the airborne 105mm artillery battery—which had previously occupied Doi Gio—had prepared strong defensive positions on the hill; and these reinforced structures had been further improved by the NVA forces defending Doi Gio.

  Lt. Col. Tran Ba Thanh decided to launch a multi-directional assault on August 9, using the 48th Reconnaissance Company and the 1st Battalion. The battle raged all day long. From the top of the hill, the enemy threw grenades and explosives and fired machineguns and 75mm recoilless weapons toward the attacking columns of the 48th moving uphill. Around 5:00 P.M., the 48th Reconnaissance Company reached the top of Doi Gio from the western slope. Using their M-72 weapons and grenades, the men from the reconnaissance company destroyed the enemy bunkers one by one. Then, the men from 1/48 Battalion launched their final assaults and overran the remaining NVA pockets of resistance on the hill. The enemy left thirty-one dead and eleven crew-served weapons. The 1/48 recovered the six 105mm howitzers from the airborne artillery battery that had been overrun on April 21.9

  While the Airborne and Marine Divisions, the 81st Commando Group, and other ranger units in the Northern Front were advancing toward Quang Tri in their seemingly unstoppable counter-attack to recapture the fallen city, the 18th Division launched its attack to retake the Quan Loi airport east of An Loc. Colonel Dao assigned this difficult mission to the 43rd Regiment and the 5th Ranger Group. On August 8, these two units had cleared Route 303 linking An Loc to Quan Loi, but were stopped by well-bunkered NVA forces outside the airport gate.

  Quan Loi airport was built by the 1st U.S. Cavalry Division to support operations near the Cambodian border. U.S. engineer units had leveled a small hill to build the runway and multiple fortified concrete structures and bunkers to protect the base; the latter were also surrounded by a fifty-meter-deep network of barbed wire. Except for the airport gate—which opened up on Route 303—the base was surrounded by relatively steep slopes, which constituted additional barriers for the defense of the airport. And now, the NVA defenders were using these structures to fight off ARVN troops assaults. Previous intelligence reports even indicated that these installations had been occupied by the headquarters of the NVA 9th Division and COSVN during the earlier attacks on An Loc.

  On August 9, the 5th Ranger Group launched the attack on the airport with the 30th and 38th Battalions. The Rangers met furious resistance from enemy units manning the concrete structures surrounding the runway. The following day, the enemy counterattacked, causing heavy losses to both battalions. The Rangers were able, however, to beat back the attack with effective close tactical air support.

  In the next two weeks, the 43rd Regiment and the 5th Ranger Group took turns attacking Quan Loi, but were able to occupy only one-third of the airport. One officer from the 30th Rangers later reported that when the battalion began the attack, his company had more than 100 soldiers, but after it was withdrawn from the battle there remained only about forty fighting men.10

  Finally, Lt. Col. Le Xuan Hieu, 43rd Regiment commander, ordered the 2nd Battalion, reinforced with the 43rd Reconnaissance Company, to bypass enemy blocking positions on the southern perimeter of defense and to attack Quan Loi airport from the northwest. The men from the 2nd Battalion had to use their M-72s and hand grenades to destroy multiple pockets of enemy resistance. In particular, one company-size chot was overrun after a short engagement. The documents captured indicated the enemy company involved was down to only twenty-five men.

  Maj. Nguyen Huu Che, the newly promoted 2nd Battalion commander, recalled that around noon, when his battalion seized the small hill on the western edge of the airport in preparation for the assault on the runway, it met strong resistance from the North Vietnamese defenders. With effective artillery and tactical air support, the battalion succeeded in eliminating the last pockets of enemy resistance. Many prisoners were captured; most of them were very young and the majority asked to be accorded the Chieu Hoi status under the government “Open Arms” policy. It was obvious that, despite intense political indoctrination and propaganda, the North Vietnamese soldiers did indeed listen to Radio Saigon and believed in the truthfuln
ess of the South Viet Nam government’s “Open Arms” program.

  In one of the chot positions that had been overrun, the 2nd Battalion discovered one wounded North Vietnamese soldier whose leg was tied to other soldiers with Chinese-made telephone wire. One battalion medic, without hesitation, jumped into the foxhole to try to save the wounded enemy soldier. One grenade exploded; the medic was killed instantly.11

  At 5:00 P.M., the 2nd Battalion was in complete control of the small hill facing the airport runway. However, from the hill the battalion had to move through a small valley covered with dense vegetation, then cross a flat plateau on the other side of the valley before reaching the runway. That small valley constituted the “meat grinder” for the 2nd Battalion as it was covered by a dense net of chot that offered fierce resistance in spite of heavy artillery and air support. Because an unusually high number of soldiers were killed in that valley, the men from the 2/43 Battalion dubbed it “The Death Valley.”

  Major Che decided to conduct night attacks to remove enemy chot. He selected the most experienced soldiers in the battalion and formed three-man teams that he equipped with a good supply of hand grenades and a cane similar to those used by blind people. At nightfall, these teams started to operate. They used their canes to find their way forward and each time their canes detected a hole or depression, they threw a grenade into it. In one single night, all chot had been eliminated while the battalion suffered no casualties.

  Finally, the 2nd Battalion succeeded in seizing the western end of the runway, which ran about one kilometer in a northeasterly direction. To the south of the runway were a few scattered civilian houses. Immediately north of the runway were heavily built defensive structures previously occupied by elements of a U.S. Cavalry brigade. Farther north were gently rolling hills leading toward a narrow valley and past that a chain of high mountains covered with dense forests. The terrain was favorable to NVA’s defense and resupply and would also provide protection and cover for their withdrawal.