Hell in An Loc Read online

  Although every indication points to the fact that the Communists had lost the battle of An Loc, Viet Nam critics brushed aside the staggering losses suffered by the North Vietnamese Army, focusing instead on the devastation done to the city. “Perhaps the best that can be said is that the city died bravely,” commented an American reporter, “and that—in a year that included the fall of Quang Tri and Tan Canh—is no small achievement.”10 But An Loc didn’t die; it stood proudly amid its rubbles as a testimony to its unshakable determination to overcome adversity.

  Viet Nam war critics also argued that the South Vietnamese needed American assistance in order to prevail. Lewis Sorley convincingly responded to that: “No one seemed to recall that some 300,000 American troops were stationed in West Germany precisely because the Germans could not stave off Soviet or Warsaw Pact aggression without American help. Nor did anyone mention that in South Korea there were 50,000 American troops positioned specifically to help South Korea deal with any aggression from the north. And no one suggested that, because they needed such American assistance, the armed forces of West Germany and South Korea should be ridiculed or reviled. Only South Viet Nam (which by now was receiving only air support, not ground forces as in Germany and Korea) was singled out for such unfair and mean-spirited treatment.”11

  In spite of the American self-appointed pundits’ assessments and analyses, one thing is clear: An Loc may have been destroyed but when the fighting ended, the South Vietnamese troops still controlled the city. “Two and two-thirds divisions [of enemy troops] is one helluva rent to pay for twenty-five percent of a small inconsequential province capital for less than thirty days of occupancy by two battered companies,” General Hollingsworth wrote in a letter.12 Andradé summed it up best when he wrote: “In war as in law, possession is nine-tenths of ownership and after the smoke has cleared An Loc remained in Saigon’s hands. Despite all the armchair analysis and polemic excuse-making, the North Vietnamese attack in III Corps had indeed been thwarted. As one anonymous American advisor observed, ‘The only way to approach the battle of An Loc is to remember that the ARVN are there and the North Vietnamese aren’t. To view it any other way is to do an injustice to the Vietnamese people.”13

  Thirteen

  The Aftermath

  The Paris Agreement

  After the ARVN’s victory in Kontum in May, the recapture of Quang Tri and the liberation of An Loc in September, Hanoi finally realized they had lost the 1972 Easter Offensive. Their best divisions had been convincingly defeated—some of them badly mauled—by the South Vietnamese Army. The debacle of the NVA’s Nguyen Hue campaign pushed Hanoi to sign the Paris Peace Agreement in January 1973 to save what was left of its invading army from attacks by ARVN units and bombardments by the USAF and VNAF. On the other hand, for the Communists, peace is considered only as a temporary phase of relative military quiescence, an expedient breathing space to be used for revising tactics and refurbishing arms for renewed fighting under more favorable conditions. Thus, shortly after the signing of the Agreement, the NVA feverishly prepared for a new invasion.

  The Paris Agreement was an American creation that allowed the United States to disengage “with honor,” but didn’t solve the basic issue over which the war had been fought for a quarter of a century. The issue, according Arnold Isaacs, a noted author on Viet Nam, was who would rule in South Viet Nam. “And this was not decided,” wrote Isaacs, “just deferred to negotiations between two sides whose perceptions contained no basis for compromise. To negotiate a settlement would require bridging a gulf of hate and suspicion that was as wide as a million graves.”1

  Worse, the Paris Agreement failed to require the withdrawal of an estimated 125,000 to 145,000 NVA troops from the South. (The Agreement had only this to say on the matter: “The question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Viet Nam shall be settled by the two South Vietnamese parties in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, equality and mutual respect, without interference, in accordance with the post-war situation. Among the questions to be discussed by the two South Vietnamese parties are steps to reduce their military effectives and to demobilize.”)

  Because the North Vietnamese were allowed to leave their troops in South Viet Nam, they continued to try to occupy as much land as possible, and to use these “liberated” zones as springboards for renewed offensives. Right after the Agreement, the Communists also began building a sophisticated network of routes across mountains and creeks to bring supplies to the South. Their engineer units worked day and night to cut roads through forests and hills. Echoes of detonations could be heard every day beyond the range of mountains west of RN1 in MRI. Three engineer and transportation divisions, under the NVA High Command, were activated to hasten the building of more roads and to expedite the flow of supplies moving south.

  President Thieu was aware of the danger posed by the presence of a large NVA force in the South, but he had to sign the Agreement under heavy pressure from the White House. “If the South Vietnamese had shunned the Paris Agreement,” explained Lewis Sorley, “it was certain not only that the United States would have settled without them, but also that the U.S. Congress would then have moved swiftly to cut off further aid to South Viet Nam. If, on the other hand, the South Vietnamese went along with the agreement, hoping thereby to continue receiving American aid, they would be forced to accept an outcome in which North Vietnamese troops remained menacingly within their borders. With mortal foreboding, the South Vietnamese chose the latter course, only to find—dismayingly—that they soon had the worst of both, NVA forces ensconced in the south and American support cut off.”2

  Dr. Henry Kissinger—who co-authored the Paris Agreement with Hanoi’s Politburo member Le Duc Tho—readily admitted NVA’s violations. As preparation for his post-Agreement meeting with Le Duc Tho, for example, Kissinger had this to say:

  To make our point, I had brought along a compilation of North Vietnamese violations in the two weeks since the signature of the Paris Agreement. The list left no doubt that Hanoi accepted no constraints of any of the provisions it has signed so recently. We had incontrovertible evidence of 200 major military violations. The most flagrant were the transit of the Demilitarized Zone by 175 trucks on February 6 and the movement of 223 tanks heading into South Viet Nam through Laos and Cambodia. Transit of the DMZ by military vehicles violated Article 15(a), on the working of which we had spent nearly two months and which banned all military traffic, as well as requiring the concurrence of the Saigon government. It also violates the explicit stipulation that new military equipment could be introduced into South Viet Nam only on the basis of one-for-one replacement through previously designated international checkpoints (Article 7). The movement of tanks through Laos and Cambodia violates Article 20, according to which all foreign troops were to be withdrawn from Laos and Cambodia and the territory of these countries was not to be used as a base for encroaching on other countries. When the tanks reached South Viet Nam, they would be also violating Article 7’s prohibition of new materials. 3

  The situation was particularly critical in MRIII where the reorganized NVA 5th, 7th, and 9th Divisions began attacking ARVN outposts near the Cambodian border to open new corridors to bring personnel and supplies into South Viet Nam from their sanctuaries on the other side of the border. The refurbished ARVN 5th Division, headquartered at Lai Khe, was the only force available to deal with the above three NVA divisions after the Paris Agreement. Consequently, ARVN forces, overextended and without U.S logistical and air support, were unable to conduct cross-border operations to destroy enemy units and their logistical installations—as they used to do before 1970.

  The Siege of Tong Le Chan (May 1972–April 1974)

  In the early stage of the NVA 1972 Easter invasion, III Corps had ordered all ranger units along the Cambodian border, such as in Ben Soi, Thien Ngon, Katum, Bui Gia Map, to withdraw to more defensible locations. Tong Le Chan was left alone because the 92nd Border Ranger Battalion, which was defending tha
t camp, volunteered to stay and fight.

  Like other border ranger camps, Tong Le Chan was formerly occupied by a unit of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (or CIDG), a paramilitary organization consisting mostly of ethnic Montagnards. It was created by the U.S. Special Forces in 1967 to detect and interdict the infiltration of VC units from their safe sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia. The CIDG program was under the direct control of the U.S. 5th Special Forces Group headquartered in Nha Trang. The organization, administration, and training of the CIDG bases were assumed by the U.S. Special Forces. The first CIDG base was located at Buon Enao in Darlac province in MRII. In 1965, there were about eighty CIDG bases established in isolated mountainous areas along the Laotian and Cambodian border. Each base was built like a fortress capable of both self-defense and infiltration interdiction.4

  Since 1965, with the massive introduction of U.S. forces into Viet Nam and the consequent “Americanization” of the Viet Nam War, the CIDG program was intensified and the border outposts had evolved into Special Forces Fire Support Bases equipped with powerful weapons and capable of conducting deep patrols into enemy territory. By 1967, there were about 100 Special Forces bases throughout South Viet Nam. Because of the strategic importance of these FSBs, the VC tried to eliminate them at all costs and many important battles took place at Lang Vei, Thuong Duc, Kham Duc and other places in MRI; Duc Co, Plei Me, Plei Djering, Plateau Gi, Dong Xoai and others in MRII; Ben Soi, Tong Le Chan, Trang Sup, Chi Linh and others in MRIII; Cai Cai, Thuong Thoi, Tinh Bien and other places in MRIV.

  Since 1970, along with the drawdown of U.S. troops in connection with the Vietnamization of the war, the CIDG Forces were transferred to ARVN and became what was known as Border Rangers. Because each Special Forces camp had from 300 to 400 members of CIDG, these units were transformed into border ranger battalions. From August 27, 1970, to January 15, 1971, forty-nine Special Forces camps, out of a total of 100, had officially become ARVN border ranger battalions; the rest of the camps were closed and their effectives were distributed among the newly created battalions.5

  Because Tong Le Chan was established near the enemy “War Zone C,” it constituted a threat to the enemy line of communication and supply. As a consequence, it had been constantly harassed and attacked. The Tong Le Chan camp was transformed into the 92nd Border Ranger Battalion on November 30, 1970. The battalion had 318 men, consisting of the original 292 members of CIDG and newly assigned ARVN officers and NCOs. Most of the men were ethnic Stieng Montagnards.6

  Map 13: Tong Le Chan

  The Tong Le Chan camp, about fifteen kilometers southwest of An Loc, was built on a small hill overlooking Road 246 linking VC’s “War Zone C” and “War Zone D.” It also sat between the Fishhook and Parrot’s Beak areas—which had been the Communist secret bases dating back to the Indochina War—and also on the vital line of communication between the COSVN headquarters in Cambodia and the VC-controlled “Iron Triangle” farther south. Because all artillery units in An Loc and Doi Gio Hill had been destroyed during the siege of An Loc, III Corps had moved two 155mm howitzers into Tong Le Chan in order to provide artillery support to the embattled garrison. It was obvious that, from the VC’s perspective, this choke point must be removed at all costs.

  On May 10, 1972, the NVA, using 130mm guns and mortars, unleashed a powerful artillery barrage on Tong Le Chan. The barrage was followed by direct 75mm recoilless rifle fire. At the same time, intense enemy anti-aircraft fire from 37mm and 57mm weapons, and even SA-7 missiles, prevented tactical air support to the besieged outpost. After the enemy lifted their artillery barrage, the VC 200th Independent Battalion, supported by direct fire from T-54 tanks’ 100mm cannons, launched their usual human wave assault. Maj. Le Van Ngon, the 92nd Border Ranger Battalion commander, waited until the attackers were about to cross the thick system of barbed wire—which was previously set up by the U.S. Special Forces around the camp—to order fire. The VCs, believing the outpost had been already annihilated by their massive artillery barrage, were taken by complete surprise. They were decimated in the open before reaching the well-protected border rangers’ defensive positions. After launching a few futile attacking waves, the enemy decided to withdraw, leaving about 100 bodies on the barbed wire.7

  The brilliant victory of the 92nd Border Ranger Battalion, however, was barely noticed because bigger and more important battles were taking place at Quang Tri, Kontum, and An Loc. In early 1973, Maj. Le Van Ngon was promoted to lieutenant colonel. As was the case for French General De Castries at Dien Bien Phu, Ngon’s new rank insignia had to be dropped by parachute. At twenty-five, Ngon was the youngest lieutenant colonel in the South Vietnamese Army. After the debacle of the VC 200th Independent Battalion, the NVA focused their attention on An Loc. In the meantime, they applied their usual “strangulation tactics” at Tong Le Chan with occasional sapper attacks, frequent shelling to inflict casualties, and murderous anti-aircraft fire to interdict air supply and medical evacuation. The NVA believed that once An Loc was taken, Tong Le Chan would fall without fighting. The longest—but least noticed—siege in contemporary military history had begun.

  Due to the thick ring of anti-aircraft weapons around Tong Le Chan, the resupply of the garrison was by parachute drops carried out by VNAF C-130s. As in the case of An Loc during the first phase of aerial resupply operations, a high percentage of the drops landed outside the camp and were recovered by the VC, as the C-130s had to fly at high altitudes to avoid being hit by enemy antiaircraft fire. With regard to medical evacuation, many helicopters had braved anti-aircraft fire to land at Tong Le Chan, but most of them were severely damaged by enemy fire. From October 1973 to the end of January 1974, only six helicopters—out of twenty medevac and resupply missions—were able to land at the camp, but three were destroyed at the LZ. In December 1973, a Chinook CH-47 was also destroyed while attempting to land at Tong Le Chan. It was the thirteenth helicopter hit by enemy anti-aircraft fire during the single month of December. VNAF casualties included nine KIA and thirty-six WIA. In January 1974, or one year after the signing of the Paris Agreement, twelve seriously wounded border rangers still remained at Tong Le Chan.8

  During 1973, the VC continued their strangulation tactics with sporadic shelling, occasional sapper attacks, and shooting at incoming aircraft. All this took a toll on the defenders; by year’s end, the 92nd Rangers were down to 255 men, including many unevacuated wounded. Tong Le Chan had also become a burden for III Corps, which had to divert scant VNAF resources for the aerial resupply of the garrison.

  As Saigon was too busy or unwilling to act to save Tong Le Chan, the situation at the camp worsened every day. Food and ammunition were running low and the number of casualties kept mounting due to frequent shelling and sapper attacks. The enemy used loudspeakers to urge the defenders to surrender but Colonel Ngon vowed to defend Tong Le Chan to the last man. Ngon told his men if the enemy overran the base, he would request air strikes on the camp so he would die with them.

  Furthermore, on April 10, 1973, elements of NVA’s 7th Division attacked and overran Chi Linh outpost on Inter-Provincial Route (IPR) 13, about twenty-five kilometers southeast of An Loc. As a result, Tong Le Chan was the only outpost left in the northern area of Binh Long province.

  To alleviate the pressure on Tong Le Chan, on July 23, 1973, the VNAF, marshalling its dwindling resources, flew over thirty missions of bombardment on NVA positions around the besieged garrison, but the results were minimal due to intense anti-aircraft fire.

  Toward the end of March 1974, the NVA renewed their attacks on Tong Le Chan. During the night of March 24, the refurbished 271st Regiment, 9th NVA Division, launched a four-pronged assault on the ranger camp after three days of intensive artillery preparation. At that time, the garrison of Tong Le Chan consisted of 254 rangers, 4 artillerymen, 12 LCDB (convicted deserters), and 7 airmen from a downed helicopter.9 Most of the defenders had been wounded at least once. At one point, the attackers were able to reach the second ring of bar
bed wire, but they were stopped and decimated by well-placed claymore mines. Although some rangers had collapsed from exhaustion and uninterrupted fighting during the battle, the rest used hand grenades to stop the following attacking waves—which had succeeded in reaching the last ring of barbed wire just in front of the defenders’ positions. The enemy finally gave up and the last survivors quickly disappeared under the cover of darkness. Although Lieutenant Colonel Ngon had beaten back the last attack, he knew that he couldn’t hold out any longer without resupply and reinforcements.

  On April 11, 1974, the NVA launched new attacks on Tong Le Chan after unleashing more than 1,000 rounds of artillery on the outpost, destroying most of the bunkers that had been heavily damaged by previous artillery barrages. Once again, the rangers held their ground, but Colonel Ngon knew the end was near. The battalion ran low on ammunition, the casualties kept mounting, and the men, totally exhausted from continuous fighting, were deemed unable to sustain another attack. Ngon requested III Corps’ permission to withdraw before the camp was overrun by the enemy. But Lt. Gen. Pham Quoc Thuan, III Corps commander, ordered Ngon to defend the camp “at all costs,” although, in all probability, Thuan knew very well the 92nd Rangers were in no position to carry out his order.

  For Colonel Ngon, however, the choice was clear: if he stayed, the battalion would be annihilated because his men were too weak to fight; on the other hand—unlike what General De Castries did at Dien Bien Phu—Ngon vowed he would never surrender to the enemy. The only choice left was to break out of the encirclement and to fight his way back toward An Loc.