Hell in An Loc Page 4
Due to a shortage of labor in the South, the French planteurs often recruited workers from North and Central Viet Nam and also from local Montagnard tribes of Stieng, Biet, and Mnong. These workers were exploited and maltreated by the French colons. Many died of malaria or other tropical diseases. Not surprisingly, many of these workers were indoctrinated by the Communist cadres who professed to fight against “imperialist oppression”; they formed their own political cells and some of them later became high-ranking officials in the Communist regime. Most notorious among them was Le Duc Anh, a former plantation worker at Loc Ninh in the old Thu Dau Mot province. He was the right-hand man for one of the French planteurs, and unconfirmed reports indicated that he, at one time, had even worked for the French intelligence. Le Duc Anh later became a general and even rose to the position of President of Communist Viet Nam after the war.
Map 4: Military Region III
Of the above five provinces, Binh Long held a special strategic importance, not only because of its proximity to Cambodia, but also because it is traversed by two important arteries: Route Nationale 13 (RN13) linking Saigon to Cambodia and Route Nationale 14 (RN14) leading to Ban Me Thuot and the Central Highlands. Binh Long was also located between two important enemy secret bases: the “War Zone C” in the west and the “War Zone D” in the east. These bases dated back to the Indochina War and were used by the Viet Minh as their safe sanctuaries.
Route Nationale 13, the natural avenue of approach to Saigon for NVA forces in Cambodia, ran the entire length of Binh Long province and bisected it into two almost equal parts. From the district town of Chon Thanh to Binh Long’s capital city of An Loc—located about thirty kilometers north—Route 13 traversed successively the towns of Tau O, Tan Khai, Xa Cat, Xa Trach, and Xa Cam. It passed through the district town of Loc Ninh, eighteen kilometers north of An Loc, before reaching the Cambodian city of Snoul. Just south of Tau O was marshy and open terrain, which constituted a formidable natural barrier for attacking units moving from the south. The slightly elevated railway running a few hundred meters east of Route 13, on the other hand, provided good protection for enemy ambushing forces.
Since 1832, under the reign of Emperor Minh Mang, Hon Quan, the future capital city of Binh Long, was part of Bien Hoa province. Under the French Colonial administration, Binh Long area was annexed to Thu Dau Mot (also known as Binh Duong) province. Under President Ngo Dinh Diem, certain districts were upgraded to province status for administrative and strategic reasons. Thus, in 1956, the northern part of Binh Duong province with the districts of Loc Ninh, Hon Quan, and Chon Thanh, was integrated into the new Binh Long province and the small district town of Hon Quan on Route 13 was renamed An Loc and made its capital city. “Binh Long” in Vietnamese means peaceful and noble (“Binh” means peace and “Long” means dragon, which is also the symbol of royalty), and “An Loc” means safe and prosperous. Ironically, by a tragic twist of fate, this province of the Valley of Deer that was destined to be peaceful and noble, and its capital city that was destined to be safe and prosperous, were to be the victims of the most savage and murderous offensive of both the Indochina and Viet Nam Wars, and Route 13, with its unlucky number, was to become one of the bloodiest roads of Viet Nam, if not of the world.
With a total area of 2,240 square kilometers and a population of about 76,000, Binh Long was one of the smallest provinces of South Viet Nam. One third of the population consisted of ethnic Montagnards of different tribes, and most of them lived in small villages around Loc Ninh. In early 1970, Col. Tran Van Nhut, commander of the 48th Regiment, 18th ARVN Division in Long Khanh province, was appointed the new Binh Long province chief by Lt. Gen. Do Cao Tri, III Corps Commander. At the beginning of 1967, Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky, the then-prime minister and a political rival of General Thieu, had started to get rid of the latter’s supporters in preparation for the upcoming presidential elections. As it was a common practice at that time to get rid of politically undesirable generals by sending them overseas as ambassadors, General Tri, a staunch supporter of President Thieu, was appointed ambassador to Seoul, South Korea. In September 1967, after General Thieu won the presidential election, General Tri was recalled from Seoul to take over the important III Corps whose units were responsible for the security of the capital.
Colonel Nhut, a former Marine officer, had distinguished himself in 1968, when, as a commander of the 18th Division training center, he repulsed the attack on the center by Regiment 275, 5th NVA Division, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy (over fifty bodies left on the terrain, many weapons captured). He was personally awarded the U.S. Silver Star by Gen. Creighton Abrams for this achievement. When Brig. Gen. Lam Quang Tho, the 18th Division commander, conveyed General Tri’s order of transfer, he advised Nhut that it would be in his best interests to decline the new position because, in General Tho’s view, the command of a regiment offers more opportunities for advancement in the army. Nhut decided, however, to accept the new offer because he wanted to come back to the area where he grew up when his father worked in the lumber industry in Loc Ninh.
Nhut, who commanded a regiment in the same Military Region, admitted, however, that his first reaction was to figure out where Binh Long province was located and what its capital city was. The city of An Loc, in fact, with a population of 15,000 people and a total area of less than two square kilometers, was an anonymous little town with no military and political significance.
As the new Binh Long province chief, Nhut lost no time reinforcing the defense of the capital city of An Loc. He conducted intensive training of the provincial Regional Force (RF), Popular Force (PF), and People’s Self-Defense Force (PSDF), and aggressively implemented the pacification program within the province, including improving relations with the ethnic Montagnards. Instead of using all his provincial forces in static defense, Nhut used two-thirds of these forces for patrols and mobile operations. He also sent the Provincial Reconnaissance teams and members of the PSDF, especially the local Montagnards disguised as civilians or farmers, to gather intelligence on enemy movements or infiltration in the forests and farmlands within the province.
The above forces, known as Territorial Forces, were drawn from the local populace and were responsible for the defense of their own towns and hamlets—or as a high-ranking U.S. advisor to the pacification program put it—the establishment of “an enduring government presence in the countryside.” RF battalions and RF companies were assigned to provinces and districts respectively, while PF platoons were normally controlled by hamlet and village chiefs.
For many centuries, Vietnamese villages formed the basic political structures of the country and constituted close-knit social entities with their own rules.1 While the district and province chiefs were appointed by the central government, the village councils as well as the village chiefs were directly elected by the people. Thus, one primordial—and often ignored—role of the Territorial Forces was that, by providing the security to the local population, and in particular to the elected village and hamlet chiefs, they were instrumental in safeguarding the grassroots democratic system in South Viet Nam.
In addition to the above Territorial Forces, Vietnamese citizens of all ages—including women and old men—were recruited into the People’s Self-Defense Force. Against the opposition of some of his advisors, President Thieu decided to provide the PSDF with weapons. Commented Lewis Sorley, a noted author on Viet Nam, “Thieu argued in response that the government had to rest upon the support of the people, and it had little validity if it did not dare to arm them. The self-defense forces used those weapons not against their government, but to fight against Communist domination, in the process establishing conclusively that the Thieu government did have the support of its people.” 2 It was the more remarkable that, as will be seen later, the killers of one of the NVA tanks during the first enemy attack on An Loc were three young members of the People’s Self-Defense Force.
In February 1971, Gen. Do Cao Tri, considered one of the best field co
mmanders in the South Vietnamese Army, was killed in a helicopter crash while directing an operation in Cambodia. Dubbed “the Patton of Viet Nam” by a foreign reporter, Tri led III Corps’ mechanized task force deep into Cambodia and succeeded in destroying many important VC logistical bases. Also killed in this accident was François Sully, a reporter for Newsweek. (François Sully and Bernard Fall were French journalists during the Indochina War; both had become American citizens.)
General Tri’s replacement was Lt. Gen. Nguyen Van Minh, commander of the Capital District (Saigon-Cho Lon and surrounding area) and a former commander of the 21st Infantry Division in the Mekong Delta. Minh was a member of what American reporters dubbed the “Delta Clan,” known for its political ties to President Thieu.
This appellation may be too broad, because only senior commanders at the 21st Division, all staunch Thieu supporters, were later rewarded with good positions in the army and in the administration. Lt. Gen. Dang Van Quang, also known as “Fat Quang,” was a case in point. A former 21st Division commander, Quang was given the command of IV Corps. After he was removed from his command for corruption by Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky, the then-prime minister, he was later elevated by Thieu to the position of Assistant to the President for National Security. In this capacity, Quang transferred Minh, his protégé, to the trusted position of commander of the Special Capital District during the 1968 Tet Offensive. In that position, Minh was not only in charge of the defense of Saigon but would also be in a position to ward off a possible coup d’etat against the Thieu regime during these chaotic months.
Minh had briefly served in a parachutist battalion in North Viet Nam during the Indochina War. Rumor had it that during his first airborne operation, he was struck on the head by a peasant armed with a shovel. This incident practically put an end to his brief career as a paratrooper. Minh was also known in the army as “Minh the Musician.” He got this surname, not only because he was a fairly good guitar player when he was young, but also because he was all music to the ears of his superiors, telling them what they wanted to hear.
Minh enjoyed excellent relations with his American advisors; they considered him a good soldier who—more importantly—was willing to listen to their advice. General Minh’s counterpart was Maj. Gen. James F. Hollingsworth, a graduate of Texas A&M University and a veteran of both World War II and the Korean War. As the III Corps senior advisor, General Hollingsworth was also the commander of the Third Regional Assistance Command (TRAC). Whereas his predecessor, the commander of II Field Force, was responsible for controlling the tactical operations of subordinate U.S. forces in MRIII, General Hollingsworth’s main focus was to provide military advice and logistical assistance to his counterpart.
Not surprisingly, one of General Minh’s first decisions after assuming command of III Corps was to replace major unit commanders with his associates from the Delta. The most crucial decision, no doubt, was the appointment of Colonel (later General) Le Van Hung to the position of 5th Division commander. During an incursion into Cambodia the previous year, the 5th Division was not deemed up to task; obviously new leadership was required to face new challenges caused by increased enemy activities in this strategic region and the disengagement of American troops under President Nixon’s Vietnamization program. In Minh’s view, Hung, a trusted and able regiment commander in MRIV, was the man he needed for that important position.
To General Minh’s credit, Hung’s appointment turned out to be a good move, because under Hung’s leadership, the 5th Division was to win what many believe to be the biggest battle of the Indochina Wars. Hung was a former commander of the 31st Regiment, 21st Division. When I served in the Mekong Delta in the mid-1960s, I heard glowing reports about Hung. He was known as a brave soldier, a good leader, and one of the best regiment commanders in IV Corps. Thus, I was somewhat disturbed later to read reports from American advisors depicting Hung as weak and indecisive during the battle of An Loc. Based on statements from Col. William H. Miller, 5th Division senior advisor, Willbanks, for example, described Hung as a “demoralized” man, “totally indecisive and unable to handle the stress of high-intensity combat.”3 In the same vein, Andradé reported that “Brigadier General Le Van Hung was devastated when the North Vietnamese opened the offensive in northern Binh Long province.”4 I thought that the problem probably arose from the fact that Hung was a rather taciturn and independent man. He liked to act on his own and was not eager to listen to the advice of his counterparts. General Hung “disliked overbearing Americans who wanted the war fought according to American rules,” wrote Andradé. “This resentment colored Hung’s relations with U.S. officers since the early 1960s, garnering him a reputation as “anti-American.”5 It is no secret that often, in the view of some U.S. advisors and reporters, so-called “anti-American” ARVN officers could do nothing right, even when the outcome of the battle clearly shows otherwise. Because Hung had undeniably won the battle of An Loc, to demonstrate his point that the 5th Division commander was “devastated” when NVA attacked Binh Long—and not Tay Ninh—Colonel Miller had to speculate about Hung’s reaction. “Miller thought that Hung would probably be happy as long as he could sit and do nothing, even if the entire country burned around him in the meantime,” wrote Andradé. “But now the chips were down and Hung’s worst fears had come true. The North Vietnamese were putting his unit on center stage. The 5th ARVN Division had to fight and Saigon would be watching.”6
It is common knowledge, indeed, that friction and misunderstanding often happened in the relationship between ARVN field commanders and their U.S. counterparts and that Vietnamese unit commanders were sometimes subjected to the rudeness of their advisors. When I was an artillery officer in I Corps in the late 1950s, for example, a U.S. senior advisor to a light infantry division near the DMZ held a routine inspection of the weapons of a division’s unit and noticed a dirty rifle. He wiped its grease on the division commander’s hand to demonstrate his point. This might not be considered unusual or impolite as far as the U.S. advisor was concerned, but this gesture constituted a supreme insult for the Vietnamese. The Vietnamese division commander slapped his American advisor and was subsequently relieved of his command.
In the early stage of the battle of An Loc, Colonel Miller suggested to General Hung that he relinquish his command to Colonel Nhut, Binh Long province chief.7 Relinquishing a command in combat is an unacceptable loss of face and would have adversely affected the morale of the troops fighting in An Loc. On the other hand, if Colonel Miller was convinced that a change of leadership was necessary, he could have forwarded his recommendation to General Hollingsworth, who would in turn discuss it with General Minh, the III Corps commander. Colonel Miller’s in-your-face suggestion, in my opinion, exemplified the attitude of arrogance I mentioned earlier.
Frances FitzGerald, the noted American journalist in Viet Nam, offered an interesting explanation of this American “colonialist” behavior in the following terms: “Covered with righteous platitudes,” she wrote,
Theirs (the American view) was an essentially colonialist vision, borne out of the same insecurity and desire for domination that had motivated many of the French. When their counterparts did not take their instructions, these advisors treated the Vietnamese like bad pupils, accusing them of corruption and laziness, and attempted to impose authority over them.8
That said, one must acknowledge, however, that while there may have been friction and misunderstanding at the higher echelons, the genuine camaraderie and esprit de corps between ARVN unit commanders and their counterparts in the field were the rule rather than the exception. The majority of U.S. officers were dedicated officers who tried to bridge the gap of cultural differences and help. The presence of the U.S. advisory team in a unit considerably contributed to the morale of the troops because they knew that, in case of heavy engagements, they could rely on U.S. air support and medevac. And many victories, including the battle of An Loc, couldn’t have been achieved without the dedicated officers and men of th
e U.S. advisory teams.
Special credit, in my opinion, should be given to province and district advisors who worked tirelessly to improve people’s lives in an effort to “win the hearts and minds” of the peasantry. Col. Edward Metzner, who spent seven years as a principal advisor to district and province chiefs, expressed the feelings of these advisors in these moving terms:
In spite of the sad outcome and the emotional scars left by our futile, costly effort, I still firmly believe that our Viet Nam cause was an honorable one and that most of those who gave of themselves in Southeast Asia and were touched by the people there feel the same way. If the stilled voices in the hamlets could speak, I believe they would testify loudly that they keenly appreciated the effort. 9
In any event, by the time General Minh assumed command of III Corps, the Vietnamization of the war was in full swing. President Nixon’s Vietnamization program called for the South Vietnamese army to take more responsibility for the conduct of the war; it also called for the phased disengagement of U.S. troops. In 1971 alone, 177,000 Americans left the country. By January 1972, only 158,000 American soldiers remained in Viet Nam. From February to April, 58,000 more U.S. troops returned to the United States.10 And this steady drawdown of U.S. troops happened at a time when the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) was building up for the Easter Offensive.
Like other corps commanders, General Minh had to redeploy his troops to replace the departing U.S. forces operating in MRIII. “As in the rest of the country, South Vietnamese units in III Corps found themselves filling large American shoes,” wrote Dale Andradé.11 In fact, according to Andradé, at the peak of the American buildup in 1968, MRIII was the operational area of a formidable U.S. force, consisting of the 25th Infantry Division, the 199th Infantry Brigade, the 11th Armored Regiment, two brigades of the 1st Cavalry Division, and one battalion of the 17th Air Cavalry Regiment. By December 1971, only one squadron of the 17th Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 1st Aviation Brigade, one squadron of the 11th Armored Regiment, and one battalion of combat engineers remained. By June 1972, except the 1st Aviation Brigade and the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division, the above-mentioned U.S. units had been withdrawn from Viet Nam.12