Hell in An Loc Page 8

  “I commanded a unit responsible for the defense of the border. I was defeated and feel very ashamed. If people say I am weak, I accept that, but don’t blame me for what I have not done,” wrote Colonel Vinh at the end of his letter.

  When I asked him to put me in contact with any of his men who were with him during the last hours of Loc Ninh so they could corroborate the above facts, Vinh said he had lost contact with his former comrades-in-arm since he had come to the United States. Thus, like Captain Smith from the American side, Colonel Vinh was the only survivor to tell the story from the South Vietnamese side. On the other hand, Col. Bui Duc Diem,34 Assistant for Operations to the 5th Division commander, reported in a telephone conversation that, to his best knowledge, Colonel Vinh didn’t surrender, but was instead captured by the enemy when the NVA captured Loc Ninh. History, sadly, may never know for sure what exactly happened during these eventful hours of Loc Ninh’s agony.

  Colonel Vinh may not have surrendered to the enemy in his own will, but in retrospect, I believe that the rapid collapse of Loc Ninh was due in great part to his failure of leadership. Although intelligence reports indicated in mid-March that an enemy attack on MRIII was imminent, Vinh had failed to take necessary actions to reinforce the district town. He should have, for instance, secured the section of Route 13 north of Loc Ninh and recalled the mechanized Task Force 1-5 back to the district town earlier to shore up the defense of the district. He could have also sent long-range patrols to detect and destroy NVA forces with air power instead of passively waiting for the enemy attack he knew was coming.

  On the other hand, Lt. Col. Nguyen Huu Duong, TF 1-5 commander, in my opinion, had failed to take appropriate precautions when he received the order to return to Loc Ninh on April 5. Instead of rolling carelessly on Route 13, he should have ordered, beforehand, the infantry to dismount and reconnoiter the area where his combined contingent was ambushed the previous day.

  In any event, again according to Captain Smith’s account, two bunkers inside the compound still held out until late afternoon April 7; by that time, however, the situation at the regiment command post had become hopeless. NVA troops were consolidating their positions inside the perimeter of defense and were on the verge of capturing the last two bunkers secured by walking wounded soldiers. Smith determined that it was time to escape. Smith, Sergeant Lull, and the South Vietnamese surgeon crossed the minefield to the southwest of the compound. Smith was wounded during a firefight with NVA soldiers. He was captured the next day, April 8, by elements of NVA 9th Division. Major Carlson, Sergeant Wallingford, and French photographer Dumont were also captured. All were brought to a prisoner camp at Kratie in Cambodia. Lull and the regimental surgeon were never heard from again. Dumond was released on July 14 in honor of the Bastille Day. The American advisors were freed in Loc Ninh on February 12, 1973, in accordance with the provisions of the Paris Peace Accords.35

  By the time the defense of the 9th Regiment headquarters collapsed, the district compound was still holding out.36 However, by nightfall the situation rapidly deteriorated: radio contact with the regiment was lost and out of the original force of over 200 RF/PF soldiers, only a few remained. Major Thinh, the district chief, and the U.S. district advisors decided that it was time to try to break out. They rushed through the airstrip and headed toward the town, avoiding enemy patrols. Major Thinh and Maj. Thomas Davidson—who was sent to Loc Ninh to gather information on the situation in the district by Lieutenant Colonel Corley, Binh Long Province senior advisor37—made it to An Loc on their separate ways, but Capt. George Wanat, acting senior advisor for Loc Ninh District, was captured thirty-one days after leaving the district. He later joined the American regiment advisors at the POW camp in Cambodia and was released with them after the Paris Agreement.38

  Lt. Col. Nguyen Ngoc Anh, former Assistant for Operations to Lt. Gen. Nguyen Van Minh and spokesman for ARVN III Corps, reported the following NVA and ARVN losses in the Battle of Loc Ninh:

  Enemy: 2,150 KIA (Killed in Action)

  2 T-54s and 1 PT-56 destroyed.

  Friendly: 600 KIA, 2,400 captured.

  38 M-41s and M-113s destroyed or captured.

  8 artillery howitzers destroyed or damaged.39

  Refugees from Loc Ninh later reported that after taking the city, the NVA organized people’s tribunals where militiamen, local government officials, and teachers were condemned and executed. The rest of the “puppet civilians” were transported by trucks to an internment camp in Snoul, Cambodia.

  While during the 1968 Tet Offensive—with the exception of Hue where more than 4,000 innocent people were massacred for not cooperating with the “revolution”—the VC, in the most part, tried to induce the urban population to participate in the “General Uprising” to overthrow the South Vietnamese government, in the 1972 Easter Offensive, they didn’t care about “winning the hearts and minds” of the population. In fact, having failed to rally the people to their cause in 1968, this time the Communists were determined to punish the “people’s enemies, reactionaries, and counterrevolutionaries.”40 During the first attack on An Loc, for example, an enemy T-54 tank rolled into a Catholic church and opened fire with its cannon and machineguns on women and children conducting prayer service, killing over 100 innocent people. The T-54 tank was later blown up by air strikes when it withdrew to the city square and put up a white flag.41

  Four

  Prelude to the Battle of An Loc

  While the battle was raging in Loc Ninh, President Thieu, on April 7, convened a meeting of the corps commanders at the Independence Palace in Saigon to assess the national military crisis. Present at the meeting were Gen. Tran Thien Khiem, the prime minister, Gen. Cao Van Vien, Chairman of the JGS, Gen. Dang Van Quang, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the four corps commanders.

  By that time, President Thieu and ARVN/JGS believed that the main thrust of the enemy Easter Offensive was in MRI. I Corps, in fact, was reeling from enemy multi-divisional assaults and the overextended 3rd Division was forced to retreat behind the Cam Lo River. The 57th and 2nd Regiments, outgunned and outnumbered, had fallen back to the new defense line extending from Dong Ha to RN 9. The 56th Regiment and the 147th Marine Brigade—the latter was under the tactical control of the 3rd Division—also suffered heavy casualties and had to abandon two strategic positions on the western flank of the 3rd Division. To make matters worse, Lt. Col. Pham Van Dinh, the 56th Regiment commander, had just surrendered to the enemy at the former U.S. Camp Carroll with the remnants of his regiment. A promising young officer, Dinh had distinguished himself during the 1968 Tet Offensive and was awarded the U.S Silver Star for heroism during the fight to retake the Citadel of Hue. His betrayal dealt a heavy blow to the morale of ARVN troops at a very critical time.

  In MRII, the situation was relatively quiet after the collapse of Tan Canh at the end of March and the first elements of ARVN’s 23rd Division had already arrived at Kontum in an effort to stop the NVA’s thrust toward Pleiku, the seat of II Corps headquarters.

  President Thieu and JGS fully realized that, due to An Loc’s close proximity to Saigon, the fall of this provincial capital would place the three attacking NVA divisions at a striking distance from the capital. However, the intensity of the attack in MRI, the massive use of artillery and missiles, the heavy casualties of the 3rd Division, and the fact that the attack on Quang Tri was directed by the NVA High Command itself, convinced President Thieu that the two northern provinces were the main objective of the enemy’s so-called Great Offensive.

  In any event, during that fateful meeting at the Independence Palace, General Minh, III Corps commander, requested additional units to help cope with the ongoing attack in Binh Long province. Minh also stressed the importance of establishing a defense line around Saigon in case An Loc was overrun and an additional division could be used for that purpose.1 He was asked to leave the room while the war council discussed his request. Minh was later recalled into the room to be i
nformed that the 21st Division in IV Corps will be put under his command to relieve An Loc. In addition, the 1st Airborne Brigade—which was providing security to the Independence Palace—and the 81st Airborne Commando Group, two of the few uncommitted units in the JGS general reserve, would be attached to III Corps for the defense of An Loc.

  During the meeting, Gen. Dang Van Quang, Assistant to the President for Security, had convinced President Thieu that the loss of a capital city so close to Saigon would be a disastrous loss of face and a big blow to the morale of the army.2 It should be noted that Quang was General Minh’s mentor. A former commander of the 21st Division, Quang recommended Minh to succeed him at that position when he was appointed IV Corps commander in 1964. Quang, Minh, and Hung, the 5th Division commander, were members of the so-called “Delta Clan.” They were all strong supporters of President Thieu who, himself, had preceded Quang as IV Corps commander. General Minh was indeed fortunate to have a mentor who had the ears of the President and thus was in a good position to help him in time of need.

  At first, President Thieu had considered putting one division from IV Corps under JGS general reserve for possible deployment in MRI to help retake the lost territory north of Cam Lo River. Then, as it was decided to put the 9th Division under the disposal of III Corps to relieve An Loc, Gen. Ngo Quang Truong, IV Corps commander,3 suggested sending the 21st Division instead because the latter had just achieved a great victory during a search and destroy operation in the U Minh Forest and had a good record in mobile operations; further, the 21st was formerly commanded by General Minh himself and that assignment would prevent any possible friction and resentment when a unit is put under a new command far away from its usual area of operation.4

  While the NVA 5th Division was launching its final assaults on ARVN positions in Loc Ninh, elements of their 9th Division were closing in on An Loc. Workers from rubber plantations around An Loc and the civilian population reported large concentrations of enemy forces—including tank units—in the vicinity of the town. Anticipating an impending major attack on the city, Colonel Nhut recommended to General Hung to reinforce Dong Long Hill (altitude 128 meters) located one kilometer north of An Loc at the northern tip of an airstrip of the same name. From Dong Long Hill ARVN troops could observe enemy activities on the entire northern sector of the city. At that time, Dong Long Hill was manned by a RF platoon. General Hung agreed to Nhut’s request and sent the 5th Reconnaissance Company to reinforce Dong Long base. This company was later replaced by the 8th Reconnaissance Company.

  Furthermore, Nhut moved the 254th RF Company, which was operating in Van Hien hamlet, twelve kilometers east of the city, to Hill 169. The latter, located about four kilometers southeast of An Loc, would allow friendly forces to observe enemy movements south and east of the city. Because of Hill 169’s strategic importance, Nhut recommended to General Hung to reinforce it with one company from the 3rd Ranger Group—which had received orders to be airlifted into An Loc in the next few days. Hung again acquiesced to Nhut’s request.5

  To prepare for the incoming attack, Nhut directed his provincial administrative assistant, Mr. Vo Tan Vinh, to coordinate with the An Loc district chief, and the heads of the Social and Information departments, in order to centralize the storage of rice and other basic necessities; to locate the refugees in safe centers away from military installations; to distribute food to the refugees; and to direct the population, via the public loud-speaker system, to dig trenches and foxholes in preparation for enemy artillery fire. “An Loc was going underground,” wrote an American reporter. Old shelters that had been dug in the houses to protect against occasional VC mortar fire in the past were enlarged and reinforced and new ones were built.

  Nhut, on the other hand, instructed Lt. Col. Nguyen Thong Thanh, the sector deputy commander, to coordinate the defense plan with friendly units, to confiscate all defense materiel, including barbed wire and sand bags from the Logistics Administration Center and even from the province’s Public Works Department, and to distribute these to provincial units and also to the units of the 5th Division. In anticipation of an enemy attack by tanks, Nhut directed that M-72 antitank weapons be issued to the members of the PSDF, who would be trained immediately on their use.6

  When General Minh ordered the 3rd Ranger Group to be heliborne into An Loc to reinforce the defense of the city on April 5, the Ranger unit was in the middle of an operation in the Parrot’s Beak area west of Tay Ninh province. The objective of the Parrot’s Beak operation was to identify the locations of the NVA 5th, 7th, and 9th Divisions that had suddenly disappeared from III Corps intelligence maps. During the incursion into the VC secret base, the rangers discovered in the Parrott’s Beak area important weapon caches, including 82mm mortars and 57mm recoilless rifles. When they encountered the enemy, the latter just put up a cursory resistance and ran away. This indicated to intelligence officers at III Corps that these were only rear service units and that the three enemy main force divisions may have already moved into Binh Long province.7

  The 3rd Ranger Group commander, Lt. Col. Nguyen Van Biet, was a brave officer. Because he was always friendly and cared for the welfare of his men, his staff officers affectionately called him “Anh Hai” (Elder Brother).

  The 3rd Ranger Group was scheduled to be transported into An Loc by Chinook helicopters from Trang Lon airfield in Tay Ninh on April 7, but because of the rapidly deteriorating situation in Loc Ninh and the weakness of the northern sector of An Loc, General Hung asked that one ranger battalion be heliborne into the city one day earlier to occupy the high ground north of An Loc and the northern defense perimeter. Colonel Biet complied and sent the 31st Ranger Battalion to An Loc on April 6.

  As the helicopters transporting Colonel Biet and his staff were approaching An Loc in the morning of April 7, the city was under enemy artillery fire. Colonel Biet was slightly wounded in the wrist after landing. Maj. Hong Khac Tran, S-3 (Operations) was also lightly wounded in the arm. The most seriously wounded were Lieutenant Tai, S-2 (Intelligence), and Captain Tho, Assistant S-3. Tai was hit in the eye by a piece of shrapnel; he eventually lost the eye entirely. Tho was hit above the ankle by shrapnel, his leg had to be amputated; he eventually recovered from his wound but was discharged from the army. All the seriously wounded were evacuated in the helicopters that brought in the last elements of the 52nd Ranger Battalion.8

  Upon arrival, the ranger units quickly occupied their assigned positions in the northeastern sector in accordance with the defense plan that had been forwarded earlier to Colonel Biet in Tay Ninh. As the rangers moved toward their assigned sectors, they could hear announcements from the provincial Open Arms Office loudspeakers asking the residents to remain calm, and assuring them that reinforcements were arriving in An Loc. The residents were also requested to go about their business, to keep a watchful eye on possible enemy infiltration, and to report immediately to local government authorities any suspicious activities.

  When Colonel Biet, accompanied by his assistant S-3 and two radiomen, reported to the 5th Division command post, he was greeted by General Hung and Colonel Vy, the 5th Division deputy commander. “You guys arrived just in the nick of time,” said Hung.9 After the short meeting, Colonel Vy briefed Biet on the friendly and enemy situation in Loc Ninh and An Loc. Before Biet left, Colonel Vy instructed him to alert the 31st Battalion about the retreating friendly infantry and armored units from Loc Ninh. The 31st Battalion must cautiously identify these units and report immediately to 5th Division Headquarters.

  Back at the 3rd Ranger Group headquarters—which was established at the old U.S. Civil Defense Group base in the city, on the top of a small hill near the 5th Division command post—Colonel Biet convened a meeting of his battalion commanders to brief them on the tactical situation in An Loc and to inquire about the status of the deployment of the ranger battalions. Maj. Truong Khanh, the 31st Ranger Battalion commander, reported that he had dispatched two companies to secure the area north of An Loc. Lt. Truong Phuoc’
s company had occupied the section of Route 13 between Dong Long Hill and Be Moi hamlet just south of Can Le Bridge. Lt. Son Do’s company was defending Dong Long Hill and the surrounding smaller hills on the east side of Route 13 north of the airfield. Maj. Tong Viet Lac, the 36th Battalion commander, reported that his unit had finished deploying along the northeastern perimeter of defense. Lastly, Maj. Le Quy Dau, the 52nd Battalion commander, reported that his unit and the 3rd Reconnaissance Company were occupying their assigned positions on the eastern sector adjacent to the 31st Battalion. One company from his battalion was defending Hill 169, southeast of An Loc, as had been requested by 5th Division.10

  In the afternoon of April 7, Chon Thanh district came under heavy artillery fire. Lt. Col. Pham Quang My, the district chief, was slightly wounded; the deputy district chief, an army major, was killed. Colonel Nhut decided to send Maj. Nguyen Van Quoc, the sector deputy chief of staff for operations and logistics, to Chon Thanh that same night to replace the Chon Thanh deputy district chief. Major Quoc would be in charge of coordinating the efforts to support the units that had received the mission to secure Route 13 and to link up with An Loc.11

  Also on April 7, after the fall of Loc Ninh, Maj. Vo Van Tay, commander of RF Company Group 3/25—that was operating in an area twenty-five kilometers southwest of An Loc—ordered the 987th and 989th RF Companies as well as PF and police forces in his area of responsibility to withdraw to Minh Thanh outpost, twenty kilometers west of Chon Thanh. Hundreds of administrative officials and their families also took refuge in the outpost. With a total force of 170 men, Major Tay and his deputy, Capt. Ho Ngoc Son, were determined to defend Minh Thanh at all costs. Like Tong Le Chan outpost farther north, Major Tay and his men held out during the entire battle of An Loc, beating back numerous NVA attacks. On April 8, the enemy launched the biggest ground attack so far after unleashing a powerful artillery barrage on the garrison. Because Minh Thanh outpost was an old U.S. Fire Support Base with strong defensive positions surrounded by an important system of barbed wire and minefields, the defenders were able to beat back the attack. (However, because of difficulties of supply and mounting casualties, on October 14, the outpost was ordered to withdraw after six months of heroic resistance. Although the evacuation was kept secret to the last minute, the enemy somehow discovered the garrison’s intention and conducted a pursuit operation to destroy the withdrawing column. Only Lieutenant Colonel Tay—who was recently promoted—and about 50% of the garrison along with twenty women and children, made it to Chon Thanh.)12