Hell in An Loc Read online

  Map 12: Route Nationale 13 Securing Operations

  On May 2, Colonel Hau, in charge of the Airborne Division Light Headquarters, committed the 3rd Battalion, which was heliborne into an area east of Route 13, between Tan Khai and Tau O. The mission of this battalion was to widen the ARVN’s control area westward and to link up with the two airborne battalions to the north. From May 5 to May 7, the 3rd Battalion engaged in heavy combat with the NVA forces at battalion level. Both sides incurred heavy losses. On May 5, the enemy directed artillery fire on the 2nd Battalion operating south of Tao O, wounding the battalion commander. Lt. Col. Ngo Le Tinh, deputy brigade commander, was directed to take over the command of the battalion. The 21st Division also reinforced the depleted 2nd Airborne Battalion with the 21st Reconnaissance Company.5 It was increasingly clear that the enemy had developed a new tactic with regard to the 3rd Airborne Brigade: They tried, if possible, to avoid engaging directly the paratroopers; instead, they kept shadowing them and at times, they closed in on the airborne units in order to harass them or to direct artillery fire on them to cause maximum casualties.

  The situation of the 3rd Battalion operating west of Route 13 was particularly critical. It was ceaselessly pursued by the enemy and heavily bombarded by enemy artillery. From May 12 to May 14, the battalion was harassed or attacked without respite. It was also bombed by mistake by a friendly warplane, killing the battalion executive officer and a number of paratroopers. On May 14, the battalion was ambushed by an NVA force when crossing an open rice field about 500 meters south of Tau O. Despite massive air support, the 3rd Battalion suffered heavy losses. The 3rd Company commander and a great number of paratroopers were killed in this ambush. The battalion had to destroy all heavy equipment in order to carry their wounded and dead soldiers. On April 15, after the battalion had been resupplied and the medevac operation accomplished, it was again harassed and targeted by enemy artillery and incurred additional casualties when moving east of Route 13.6 In the meantime, the 1st Battalion operating in the Duc Vinh area was unable to move north because of the inability of the other two battalions to secure Route 13 north of Tau O and to link up with it.

  Because of the deteriorating situation in MRI, ARVN/JGS decided to pull the 3rd Airborne Brigade out of Binh Long in order to reinforce the Airborne Division (minus two brigades), which was defending the My Chanh River, the last ARVN line before Hue. The 3rd Airborne Brigade would be replaced by the 15th Regiment, 9th Division, which was operating in the Mekong Delta. The 15th Regiment was commanded by Lt. Col. Ho Ngoc Can, a fearless man and one of the most decorated officers in the South Vietnamese Army. Can had graduated from Vung Tau Thieu Sinh Quan School, a school reserved for children of military personnel who chose to follow their fathers’ footsteps. The students were subjected to a strict military discipline and were imbued with a high sense of duty and service to the country. Those who graduated from the school were sent to officer schools while those who didn’t graduate served as non-commissioned officers. Many graduates had become high-ranking generals in the South Vietnamese Army.

  Following are the losses during the bloody fighting between the 3rd Airborne Brigade and NVA blocking forces south of An Loc:

  Enemy: 254 KIA, 1 captured

  12 crew-served and 19 individual weapons captured.

  Friendly: 60 KIA, 340 WIA, 24 MIA

  21 crew-served and 38 individual weapons lost.7

  While the 3rd Airborne Brigade was heavily engaged north of Tau O and was unable to effectuate a link-up with the 1st Airborne Brigade just south of An Loc, the 21st Division encountered heavy enemy resistance north of Chon Thanh. On May 1, the 31st Regiment air assaulted an area seven kilometers north of that town. The regiment was attacked by elements of the 165th Regiment, 7th Division, right after landing. During the course of the battle north of Chon Thanh, the 165th Regiment was reinforced with the 209th Regiment, also from the NVA’s 7th Division. As the 31st Regiment was still unable to advance, the 21st Division ordered two battalions of the 32nd Regiment to conduct an envelopment east of the enemy positions on May 6. On May 8, the 3rd Battalion, 31st Regiment, launched a vertical envelopment by air assaulting an area north of the line of contact. Despite massive fire power, consisting of eight B-52 strikes, 142 sorties of tactical air support and some 20,000 rounds of artillery,8 the 31st Regiment was unable to remove the enemy blocking positions south of Tao O. During the battle north of Chon Thanh, the enemy left many bodies on the terrain, but the 21st Division also paid a heavy price in that encounter: the commander of the 31st Regiment, Col. Nguyen Huu Kiem, was seriously wounded, two battalion commanders (Captains Hoi and Nhuong) from the 31st Regiment, as well as the executive officer of the 2nd Battalion, 32nd Regiment, were killed; over 300 soldiers were also killed.9

  The 21st Division incurred heavy losses on Route 13 because, during the 1972 offensive, the Communists had devised a new blocking tactic consisting of what they called chot and kieng. Chot in Vietnamese means bolt, pin, or a fastening devise to close a door. A chot usually consisted of an A-shaped six-meter-deep trench with reinforcement overhead, constructed in a horseshoe configuration on a key terrain feature, that allowed for effective enfilade fire on likely avenues of approach. The chot were categorized as “A” (squad size), “B” (platoon size), and “C” (company size). “Kieng” in Vietnamese means chain, or shackle. Kieng in Communist military parlance means a system of inter-connected chot which provided for mutual support and a solid defense in depth. With this system of chot and kieng, the enemy was able to use a relatively small force to effectively block a much bigger force for a long period of time. The chot-kieng system south of An Loc was established generally along the railway running parallel to Route 13 and was concentrated behind the deep marshes in Tao O creek area. It was linked to the rubber plantations west of Route 13 by an elaborate network of trenches that allowed for resupply and medical evacuation.

  While the NVA’s 5th and 9th Divisions were launching the third attack on An Loc on May 11, the 32nd Regiment, reinforced with an element of the 5th Armored Squadron, and the 6th, 73rd and 84th Ranger Battalions, began a new offensive to dislodge the enemy blocking positions south of Tao O. The attackers met strong resistance from the NVA 209th Regiment, reinforced with the Reconnaissance Company of the 7th Division, the 94th Sapper Company, and the C 41 Anti-Tank Company.10 The enemy forces were deployed over a three-kilometer front in the middle of hilly terrain covered with dense vegetation, which constituted formidable obstacles to the attacking forces. It took three days of extremely heavy fighting for ARVN attacking forces to defeat the NVA blocking units about eight kilometers north of Chon Thanh. On May 13, both the NVA 165th and 209th Regiments, severely beaten, withdrew to new defensive positions south of Tau O creek where they took advantage of a strong connecting network of underground blocking positions to stop the advance of the ARVN’s 32nd Regiment.

  Despite massive artillery and air support, including B-52 strikes, for the next forty days, from May 11 to June 21, the 32nd Regiment was unable to destroy well-entrenched NVA forces. The casualties for both sides during that period reflected the viciousness of the battle to secure Tao O—known as the battle of Tau O Bridge—probably the most ferocious fighting during the rescuing operation:

  32nd Regiment: 95 KIA (including a battalion commander), 455 WIA, 4 MIA, 4 M-113s damaged.

  Enemy: 503 KIA, 37 crew-served and 71 individual weapons captured.11

  The 209th Regiment of the 7th Division alone lost over 250 killed and most of its crew-served weapons. Despite these staggering casualties, Hanoi’s English-language propaganda publications considered the stalled South Vietnamese drive a victory for the “people’s forces.” “Nguyen Van Thieu had sworn to relieve Route 13 before June 19, 1972—the ARVN Day—but now he still remains helpless,” bragged the propaganda. “Thus, Route 13 is not only the ‘Road of Thunder,’ but also a ‘Road of Death’ for Nixon’s strategy of ‘Vietnamization’ of the war.”12

  The enemy mess
ages captured at that time showed, however, that after two months of fierce engagements with South Vietnamese attackers, the NVA blocking units, constantly bombarded by U.S. and V.N. warplanes, suffering heavy losses in terms of human lives and weapons, and fighting under the sweltering summer heat of the inland plateaux, had become hopeless and demoralized. They urgently requested supplies, rice, and water, and openly cursed on their radios without bothering to camouflage their messages.13

  However, despite mounting casualties and lack of supplies, the enemy blocking forces, well-protected by their reinforced chot-kieng system and regularly replaced by fresh troops, were able to resist the advance of the South Vietnamese attackers. Explaining ARVN units’ failure to secure Route 13, Colonel Franklin, 21st Division senior advisor, commented that, “it doesn’t take a lot of guys in bunkers to stop an uncoordinated attack,”14 implying that the attacks were not well orchestrated and powerful enough to overwhelm the enemy.

  In reality, to remove the well-bunkered chot, mass and fire power were not the answer. Attacking en masse in this case may have caused unnecessary losses of lives. As the experience in MRI indicated, what was needed instead were initiative, exploitation of the terrain features, and close combat technique. In his book Memoirs of An Loc, Dr. Nguyen Van Quy, the An Loc surgeon, related an interesting story in this regard. In 1972, Dr. Quy was recognized as one of the most outstanding soldiers of the year and, along with other nominees, was awarded a one-week vacation in Taiwan. During the trip, Quy befriended Cuong, a young corporal from the Airborne Division, who told him how he was selected.

  In June 1972, the Airborne Division’s counter-attack to recapture Quang Tri ran into stiff resistance from NVA’s blocking positions from the high ground west of Route Nationale 1. Corporal Cuong and two volunteers from his squad climbed to the top of the hill behind the enemy chot in an area covered with high grass. Hearing the noise behind them, three NVA soldiers left their bunker to reconnoiter the suspect area; the paratroopers discharged their M-16s and killed them all. Cuong dispatched one man to report their action to his platoon leader and asked for reinforcement in case of enemy counter-attack. The remaining paratroopers then occupied the enemy chot after having set up a claymore mine on a small trail behind their position they expected the enemy would use for supply or replacement. Sure enough, about ten minutes later, three NVA soldiers appeared on the trail. As they were about ten meters from the claymore mine, Cuong detonated the mine, and when the smoke cleared, all that was left were some charred body parts and a lot of blood. Afterward, Cuong and the reinforcing platoon destroyed the other chot downhill without difficulty.

  When asked about his exploit, Cuong said he was very proud of his achievement, but he also felt somewhat uneasy because the NVA soldiers he killed were very young, maybe eighteen or nineteen years old. He had a young cousin about that age who stayed in Hanoi after the partition of Viet Nam in 1954, and the thought that he may have killed his own cousin made him feel very uncomfortable.15

  While the Route 13 securing operations had just begun, the fall of the city of Quang Tri in MRI on May 1 caused an important change in the command structure of the South Vietnamese army. Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong, IV Corps commander, was appointed the new I Corps commander, and was put in charge of the counter-attack to recapture Quang Tri. Truong had a remarkable military career, to say the least. Back in 1964, Truong was a captain commanding an airborne battalion. Seven years later, he was a lieutenant general and corps commander.

  Maj. Gen. Nguyen Vinh Nghi, the commander of the 21st Division—which was haltingly fighting its way toward An Loc—was appointed IV Corps commander to replace General Truong. Col. Ho Trung Hau, in charge of the Airborne Division Light Headquarters at Lai Khe, was elevated to brigadier general and took over the command of the 21st Division.

  The corps commanders constituted the most exclusive club in Viet Nam. Foreign anti-war correspondents called them “warlords”; the Vietnamese press called them the four “pillars” of the Thieu regime. They were selected from the most trusted officers who were members of the President’s inner circle. Many of them were Thieu’s cadets when he was instructor at the military academy in Dalat in the mid-1950s, because, according to Confucian tradition, the students must respect and be loyal to the teacher. General Nghi was one of these cadets.

  Immediately after he assumed command of the 21st Division, General Hau tried to create a diversion by ordering division engineer units to repair the western portion of Inter-Provincial Route 13 east of Chon Thanh and moving his mechanized units as if to launch an attack on the enemy’s rear in Dong Xoai area. Hau hoped that this feigned attack would force the enemy to release the pressure on the relief column, but this stratagem apparently hadn’t worked as the enemy resistance on Route 13 had not lessened.16

  On May 11, as the 32nd Regiment of the 21st Division was launching a new offensive north of Chon Thanh, the 9th Division’s 15th Regiment, reinforced with the 9th Armored Squadron, arrived in the district town. On May 14, the 15th was ordered to send one company from the 2nd Battalion into An Loc to reinforce the garrison. However, due to heavy anti-aircraft fire, the helicopters were unable to land and had to return to Lai Khe. That afternoon, by order of the 21st Division, the 15th Regiment became Task Force 15 (TF-15) consisting of 1/15, 2/15, 3/15 Battalions, 15th Reconnaissance Company, 9th Armored Squadron, one 105mm battery and one 155mm platoon.

  The next day, May 15, 1/15 Battalion, reinforced with the 9th Armored Squadron and Battery 95C, launched an eastern envelopment by seizing Ngoc Lau, east of Route 13, and reached Tan Khai without incident. The following day, 2/15 Battalion air assaulted into Bau Nat village, 1,500 meters east of Tan Khai, then linked up with the 1/15 at the above location. Afterward, TF-15 headquarters, plus one combined 105mm and 155mm battery, were heliborne into Tan Khai to establish FSB Long Phi.17

  On May 17, the 15th Reconnaissance Company and the 3/15 Battalion air assaulted an area northwest and west of Tan Khai, respectively. At the same time, one battalion from 33rd Regiment/21st Division, was heliborne into FSB Long Phi to replace the 2/15 Battalion; the latter was ordered to link up with the 3/15 Battalion. The remaining units of the 33rd Regiment also were instructed to move to Tan Khai through the forested areas east of RN13 in order to participate in the much anticipated thrust toward An Loc. The 33rd Regiment column was repeatedly engaged by the enemy forces and sustained heavy casualties. In a period of only fifteen days, the regiment suffered 50 KIA and 300 WIA.18

  The next day, TF-15, reinforced with the 9th Armored Squadron on the west and the 33rd Regiment(-)/21st Division, on the east, using Tan Khai as the line of departure, began to move northward in an effort to link up with the besieged capital city of Binh Long. On the same day, NVA started shelling FSB Long Phi. On May 19, TF-15 made contact with the enemy as it was about to enter Duc Vinh 2 hamlet. In the next few days, the enemy tried to close in on the units of TF-15, staying within fifty meters of ARVN positions, while pounding the latter with mortars and rockets (the Communists called this the “grab the belts” tactic). At the same time, NVA forces started to surround and bombard FSB Long Phi with increasing intensity. Faced with this new threat to its rear, Colonel Can, TF-15 commander, dispatched 1/15 Battalion to reinforce the defense of the strategic Long Phi base, which not only provided fire support to the attacking forces, but also served as the logistical and medical evacuation base for the defenders at An Loc.

  During the night of May 20, while TF-15 was silently crossing Xa Cat creek to move toward Duc Vinh 2 hamlet, the advance elements reported hearing the roars of tank engines in front of them. The next day, the task force continued to move northward, but it was stalked by the enemy reconnaissance elements and received sporadic shelling. Small contacts with the enemy were also reported. Lt. Col. Ho Ngoc Can, task force commander, ordered his units to “progress in echelons”: the first unit that reached a designated point stopped and dug in to support the second echelon elements; when the latter reached another
objective forward, they again dug in to cover the advance of the first echelon units, and so on. This formation provided effective mutual support when progressing into enemy-held territories.19

  Due to strong anti-aircraft fire, TF-15 had to be supplied by parachute drops. On May 22, when the task force reached an area about one kilometer south of Thanh Binh hamlet, it was surrounded and attacked by NVA forces. The situation became very critical as the number of wounded and dead kept mounting. The lightly wounded soldiers stayed at their positions to fight off the enemy assaults while the dead had to be buried on the spot.

  As a result of mounting casualties on both sides, a tacit agreement was reached during that period; it called for a cease-fire at the end of each day to allow for the dead to be buried and the wounded to be evacuated to the rear.

  On May 23, the enemy mounted another tank-supported assault. At 6:00 A.M., enemy tanks broke through the friendly lines. The lead PT-76 was destroyed but other tanks continued to advance. The defenders held their line and destroyed another tank. The enemy finally broke off, leaving behind twenty-four bodies and eighteen assorted weapons. TF-15 had twelve KIA and twenty-five WIA.20 To support TF-15’s defense, B-52 strikes hit enemy supporting elements in Thanh Binh hamlet.

  During this period, medical evacuation and resupply missions couldn’t be carried out by helicopters or parachute drops because friendly and enemy positions were only about 100 meters apart. Thirsty soldiers from TF-15 couldn’t even get water from nearby Xa Cat creek because the enemy would shoot at them from the other side of the creek. As a result, TF-15 had to stop its progress northward, and to use the APCs from the 9th Armored Squadron to escort medical evacuation and resupply convoys from Duc Vinh to Tan Khai and vice versa. The medevac and resupply operation was carried out without incident.