Hell in An Loc Read online

  On May 24, however, the 9th Armored was ambushed on the above itinerary by NVA 141st Regiment, 7th Division, which used all kinds of antitank weapons such as B-40s, B-41s, recoilless rifles, and even AT-3 Saggers. In particular, the B-41 rocket with an effective range of 400 meters was very deadly against lightly armored M-113s. The 9th Armored Squadron incurred heavy losses (8 KIA, 77 WIA, 8 MIA, 22 APCs damaged) and had to return to Long Phi Base to be reequipped and reorganized. The enemy left twenty bodies and fourteen individual weapons were captured.21

  The next day, after having consolidated a new base about one kilometer south of Thanh Binh hamlet, TF-15 continued its northward progression. It was attacked by the enemy and had to stop and defend in place. In the meantime, the 33rd Regiment (-), moving from Dong Phat hamlet toward An Loc, was stopped by furious resistance from NVA blocking forces.

  According to Lt. Col. Nguyen Ngoc Anh, Assistant for Operations/III Corps, radio intercepts confirmed the presence of NVA 7th Division headquarters in an area seven kilometers southwest of An Loc and the 165th Regiment of the 7th Division in the middle of Xa Cam plantation four kilometers south of An Loc. The regiment headquarters occupied a large reinforced underground bunker built under the railway; it was protected by a dense system of chot-kieng, which had been able to stop the progression of Regiment 33/21st Division and TF-15, causing heavy losses to these two units. General Minh had requested B-52 strikes on this formidable defense structure—the last obstacle to the liberation of An Loc—but Minh’s request had been denied by the III Corps U.S. advisory team for unspecified reasons.22

  As a consequence, General Minh turned to the VNAF for assistance. At a meeting at III Corps Headquarters in early June with Brig. Gen. Huynh Ba Tinh, commander of the Bien Hoa-based 3rd Air Division and his deputy, Col. Nguyen Van Tuong, Minh wanted to know if the 3rd Air Division had any CBU bombs or other bombs capable of destroying the enemy chot system at Xa Cam, and the kind of aircraft that can deliver these bombs. Minh added that the issue of infringement on the USAF’s assigned zone of responsibility also needed to be addressed.

  After a brief consultation with Colonel Tuong—who was both 3rd Air Division deputy commander and commander of the division’s fighter squadron—General Tinh answered that it was his understanding that the U.S. warplanes usually returned to their bases or aircraft carriers after 6:00 P.M., and as a consequence, AD-6 Skyraiders from his division could drop CBU bombs on enemy positions at Xa Cam after 6:00 P.M.

  At that point, General Tinh introduced Colonel Tuong, his deputy, to elaborate on the availability and delivery of CBU bombs. Tuong reported that he had five or seven small-size CBU bombs given to him by the Americans and that the best means to deliver these bombs would be by slow-flying (maximum speed 320 mph) AD-6 Skyraiders; these single-seat attack bombers could drop the bombs with more accuracy on the intended targets than the A-37 jet fighters.

  General Minh concluded the meeting by ordering the destruction of the enemy chot at Xa Cam by CBU bombs dropped by the 3rd Air Division’s Skyraiders.23

  One piece of good news, finally, that boosted the morale of the relief forces: The 6th Airborne Battalion, which had been severely defeated in the Doi Gio-Hill 169 area southeast of An Loc on April 21, had been refurbished and reorganized, and was ready to act. On June 4, the 6th, with an effective force of 600 men, was heliborne into Long Phi FSB, bringing with it a 2,200-man replacement contingent for TF-15 and 33rd Regiment/21st Division in Tan Khai, and other units in An Loc; the latter had not received replacements since April 13, the date of the beginning of the attacks on the city. 24

  On June 6, the 6th Airborne Battalion—reinforced with the remaining 1,000 replacements for the units defending An Loc—was heavily engaged by the enemy just north of Duc Vinh 2 hamlet. Although most of the men were new recruits, the battalion fought valiantly because the original officers had remained with the unit and also because Lt. Col. Nguyen Van Dinh, the battalion commander, had vowed to return to An Loc to avenge his earlier defeat. The 6th Airborne succeeded in destroying the enemy blocking positions with relatively limited casualties: one KIA, sixty-four WIA. The enemy left thirty-one dead; two crew-served and twelve individual weapons were captured.25

  On June 7, the 33rd Regiment (-), 21st Division, and TF-15 were able to evacuate some wounded soldiers. After the completion of the medevac operation and after having been replenished and resupplied, TF-15 on the left, the 33rd Regiment in the middle, and the 6th Airborne Battalion on the right, renewed their progression toward An Loc.

  The same day, at 6:30 P.M., two VNAF A-37s strafed the enemy positions in Xa Cam in preparation for the CBU bombing run; they were followed by four Skyraiders that dropped successively four CBU bombs on the 165th Regiment‘s chot system, causing four big explosions and flattening an area one kilometer around the target.

  After the VNAF airplanes had left the area, General Minh—who was circling the Xa Cam hamlet in his C&C helicopter—ordered the 6th Airborne Battalion to attack northward to destroy the remnants of this last enemy blocking position south of An Loc. The paratroopers quickly overran Xa Cam and discovered about 200 intact bodies in a 300-square-meter bunker built three meters underneath the railway; the North Vietnamese troops were obviously killed by the tremendous pressure exerted by the CBU bombs. Among the dead was an officer with a senior colonel rank insignia.26

  On June 8, when moving toward the eastern part of Thanh Binh hamlet, the 6th Airborne engaged again with the enemy. Exploiting its apparently irresistible momentum, the paratroopers overwhelmed the enemy resistance, killing seventy-three North Vietnamese soldiers and capturing two crew-served and thirty-three individual weapons. The 6th Airborne suffered eleven KIA and thirty-one WIA.27 In probably the most spectacular action of the rescuing operation, the 6th Airborne Battalion cleared the remaining two kilometers to Thanh Binh hamlet in a forty-five-minute battle. An Loc was finally linked up when the 62nd Company of the 6th Battalion shook hands with the 81st Company of the 8th Battalion at 5:45 P.M. on June 8, 1972.28 That historic handshake marked the beginning of the end of the siege of An Loc.

  Lt. Col. Nguyen Van Dinh, 6th Airborne Battalion commander, and Lt. Col. Tran Thien Tuyen, exective officer, 8th Airborne Battalion, both graduates of the Vietnamese Military Academy, heartily embraced amid the wild cheers of the paratroopers.

  Phan Nhat Nam, an army reporter and former officer in the Airborne Division, who visited the 6th Airborne Battalion after the above described link-up at an area about 1,700 meters south of An Loc, recalled that from his vantage point, he could only see one red-roofed, multi-story building still standing in the city. Next to where he stood, fifty-six North Vietnamese bodies from C7, C8 (7th and 8th Companies), 2nd Battalion, 275th Regiment, 5th Division, piled up inside defensive fortifications. Nearby lay two dead T-54s and three charred tanks of an unidentified model with their heads buried in bomb craters and their engines blown up by hand grenades.29

  As Nam was ready to leave the 6th Battalion to head toward the 5th Battalion located 800 meters further north, Lieutenant Colonel Dinh, the 6th Battalion commander, told him to be careful and to watch for the direction of enemy artillery fire. “If the fire comes from the southeast, don’t worry; if it comes from the northwest, you must lean your back against a rubber tree or jump into a foxhole right away.”30

  When Phan Nhat Nam arrived at the 5th Airborne Battalion’s location thirty minutes later, he was surprised to see no soldiers on the surface of the earth. Apparently, the paratroopers had gone underground. When he started to call Lieutenant Colonel Hieu, the battalion commander, he saw a few steel helmets emerging from the earth like “tiny graves.” At the sound of the ensuing departing enemy artillery fire, the paratroopers plunged into their foxholes like “small creatures burying themselves in the beach sand at the noise of approaching passers-by.”31 Finally, after a few minutes, Colonel Hieu emerged from his bunker to greet him. The battalion commander invited Nam to his underground bunker and offered him a can of hot
beer.

  “It has been a while. I haven’t seen the sun,” said Hieu, “the enemy still targets this area, and if I get killed, the morale of the unit would suffer.”32

  TF-15 finally linked up with elements of the 1st Airborne Brigade near Thanh Binh hamlet. Colonel Nhut, province chief, went out to personally greet Lt. Col. Ho Ngoc Can, task force commander, and his advisor, Maj. Mandela Craig. Nhut presented them with a bottle of cognac, the last bottle in the entire city. It was a fitting reward for an embattled unit that had paid a heavy price for having successfully carried out its difficult mission after uninterrupted murderous combat with the enemy 7th Division: During the Route 13 reopening operation, TF-15 had 153 KIA, 592 WIA, 27 MIA; one M-60 machinegun and three M-16s were lost. The enemy had paid a heavier price trying to stop TF-15 from linking up with the garrison: They suffered 304 KIA; ARVN captured 41 crew-served and 85 individual weapons, and destroyed two PT-76 tanks.33

  Even before the link-up, toward the end of May, the situation in An Loc had considerably improved. Uninterrupted air strikes had taken a heavy toll on the enemy forces and in particular on their anti-aircraft weapons that ringed the city. Intelligence reports indicated that the NVA had even filled up their depleted units with Cambodian Khmer Rouges soldiers, who, worst of all, often refused to fight. By early June, helicopters were able to land at An Loc for resupply and medevac. June 9, the day following the link-up, was the day when twenty-three helicopters were able to land safely and evacuate hundreds of wounded who had waited so long in the inferno of An Loc.

  By mid-June, An Loc was secure enough for visits from VIPs. A few days after the link-up, General Hollingsworth and Sir Robert Thompson, Special Advisor to President Nixon—and the man in charge of the successful counterinsurgency campaign in Malaysia after WWII—came to An Loc. Colonel Nhut showed them the NVA tanks that had been destroyed inside the city. Sir Thompson told Nhut that An Loc was the biggest victory in the post-World War II era, far exceeding the battle of Dien Bien Phu.34

  On June 16, Gen. Nguyen Van Minh and General Hollingsworth landed in An Loc. Colonel Nhut reported that on the way to 5th Division Headquarters, Hollingsworth suddenly stopped in front of Lt. Col. Art Taylor, senior advisor to the 1st Airborne Brigade, and pinned a U.S. Silver Star on his uniform. Taylor, perplexed and moved, started to cry; Nhut also felt tears swelling in his eyes.35

  During his first visit to An Loc since the NVA offensive, General Minh pinned the colonel rank insignia on the uniform of Lieutenant Colonel Huan, the 81st Airborne Commando Group commander. On this occasion, Minh took time to explain that Huan was not the only person worthy of recognition, but that many more would be rewarded in due time. Afterward, Nhut invited General Minh to visit Dr. Quy’s operating bunker to meet the famous surgeon, who had performed a total of 254 major operations under very primitive conditions. The visiting party was somewhat embarrassed to see a near-term pregnant woman lying in pain on Dr. Quy’s operating table. Obviously, the enemy, defeated and demoralized, preferred to run away than to stay and fight and inflict casualties on ARVN troops, and Dr. Quy’s operating room now had to deal with emergencies of a different nature.

  Ten

  End of the Siege

  Immediately after the historic link-up between the 6th and 8th Airborne Battalions, ARVN troops launched a counter-attack to recapture the lost terrain in the city. In the north, the 81st Airborne Commando Group and the 3rd Ranger Group reoccupied the northern part of An Loc without encountering enemy resistance. On June 10, the commandos captured one soldier who was hiding under a deep underground bunker. He said he was a cook with a unit from the 5th Division. He also disclosed that there were so many soldiers killed in his unit that he was ordered to pick up a weapon and fight, but he was so scared that he kept digging a bunker to avoid Air Force bombs.1

  The next day, the 3rd Ranger and the 81st Commando attacked northward in tandem to retake the high ground north of An Loc. On June 12, the 36th Ranger Battalion raised the national flag on the artillery dependents quarters. Subsequently, the 52nd Ranger Battalion seized the Dong Long airport and high ground next to Dong Long Hill to support the advance of the 81st Commando Group. The commandos took Dong Long Hill, the dominant terrain north of An Loc the same day, after a well-executed pincer movement.

  The commando attacking units consisted of the 2nd and 3rd Commando Companies and four reconnaissance teams under Capt. Nguyen Son, Capt. Pham Chau Tai and Lt. Le Van Loi, respectively. During the night of June 11, the above units, advancing in three different columns, reached a location near the top of Dong Long Hill. At daybreak, the commandos launched a surprise attack on the enemy positions by shooting and throwing hand grenades into the enemy bunkers. The North Vietnamese panicked and fled into a nearby forest, leaving behind many dead and weapons. In the morning of June 12, Lieutenant Loi proudly raised the national flag on Dong Long Hill.2 The same day, General Hung declared to a Viet Nam Radio reporter that the city of An Loc was completely liberated.

  An officer who participated in the attack to recapture Dong Long Hill described the bloody battle of June 12 in the following terms: “My eyes were blurred by the heroic images of my friends. His right hand severed by a bullet, Thieu calmly raised his hand to slow down the bleeding and kept shooting with his weapon held against his body with his left hand, as if he were holding a torch while firing in the midst of smoke and dust. Y Muih Mlor, his hand bleeding profusely, standing calmly on the roof of the enemy bunker as if nothing happened to him; and this very morning Vosary, his lower jaw taken by an enemy bullet, pointing in the direction of the enemy bunker to his friends. A man with dark skin, his mouth full of red blood, a picture that frightened the little Viet Congs or at least made them shiver. These pictures in part reflected the bravery of the airborne commandos which can be seen only in times of crisis.”3

  During an ensuing pursuit operation, the commandos discovered a deep bunker on the edge of a neighboring forest. Hearing some noises coming from below, the commandos, instead of throwing hand grenades into the bunker as was normal procedure under the circumstances, called the suspected NVA soldiers to get out and surrender, because they believed the enemy was in no mood to put up a fight at this stage. The commandos were stunned to see two little girls emerging from the bunker. One commando later commented that they looked like two “moving skeletons.” The two girls, may be six or seven years old, were indeed emaciated, dazed, and too weak to climb out of the bunker; their clothes were in tatters.

  The commandos took the girls to their headquarters and gave them food and clothing. The two girls, named Ha Thi Loan, eight, and Ha Thi No, nine, finally explained that their father was RF Sergeant Ha Van Hien, who was a member of the RF unit defending Dong Long. When Dong Long was overrun on April 13, their mother took them and their younger brother and tried to flee toward the city. Their mother was killed by an artillery shell and their younger brother, seriously wounded, later died in the bunker where they were hiding. The two girls sustained themselves for two months with some vegetables and water from rain. They also ate raw chickens that were killed by artillery fire.4

  Nguyen Cau, the army TV reporter embedded with the 5th Division, made arrangements to evacuate the two girls to Saigon where they were finally reunited with their father after the siege of An Loc. The Associated Press shortly thereafter interviewed Cau about the circumstances of the rescue of Thi Loan and Thi No. Time Magazine also published the story of the two girls. In 1974, an American couple adopted the girls with the permission of their father and the Vietnamese government.5

  In the meantime, in the western sector, the 7th Regiment (-) retook the area that had fallen into enemy hands on May 11 during the NVA’s third attack on the city. In the south, the paratroopers also expanded their control to effectuate a link-up with Task Force 15. Unit commanders reported that the enemy just ran away every time they were engaged by the ARVN troops.

  In the mopping-up operations around An Loc, the units discovered the hulks of burned-out
tanks scattered all over the battlefields, including a dozen tanks abandoned inside B-52 craters, which constituted unexpected obstacles to the movements of enemy armored vehicles. In an area three kilometers southwest of An Loc, previously targeted by B-52s, ARVN troops discovered 208 bodies with assorted weapons. In the area west of the perimeter, ARVN troops discovered an enemy headquarters which had been destroyed by C-130 gunships; inside the command post the soldiers found damaged communication equipment and many skeletons. On June 12, all areas two kilometers around the city that were occupied by NVA forces in the previous two months had been retaken, and as one senior ARVN officer in An Loc put it, “the national flag of South Viet Nam began to flutter in the winds over the sky of the newly liberated heroic Binh Long.” 6

  Capt. Charles Huggins, an advisor with the 81st Airborne Commando, recalled that by that time most of the North Vietnamese had fled, leaving behind their dead, wounded, and weapons. “In the end,” Huggins said, “the NVA were scared to death. They were crowded in bunkers, sometimes as many as 15 in a fighting position with only two firing points. They wouldn’t fight.”7

  After the link-up of the 6th Airborne Battalion and TF-15 with the 1st Airborne Brigade at Thanh Binh hamlet, south of An Loc, Gen. Ho Trung Hau, 21st Division commander, declared his mission accomplished. Hau’s optimism was somewhat premature because, despite the above link-up, the 21st Division was still bogged down north of Chon Thanh. On June 6, Lt. Col. Edward J. Stein and the 31st Regiment commander and his party were ambushed and cut off from the regiment. Stein was able to request tactical air support through a U.S. FAC. Two A-37s braved strong antiaircraft fire to provide close support and save the entire party.8