Hell in An Loc Read online

  The language barrier may be another reason many acts of heroism by South Vietnamese soldiers were ignored by the U.S. media. According to a U.S. reporter who covered the Viet Nam War in the 1960s and 1970s, few U.S. reporters tried to learn Vietnamese while the South Vietnamese were never good at explaining themselves. I believe that Americans’ reluctance to learn other countries’ culture and language is the reflection of their arrogance and that this situation resulted from a basic American ethnocentric attitude, which consisted of judging other people by using American customs and standards, or worse, by judging other people’s customs and standards as inferior to the American ones.

  Tracing a parallel between the Viet Nam War and the Iraq War, Robert G. Kaiser, an associate editor of the Washington Post, who covered the Viet Nam War in 1969 and 1970, recently wrote: “In truth, we are ethnocentric to a fault, certain of our superiority, convinced that others see us as we do, blithely indifferent to cultural, political and historical realities far different from our own. These failings—more than any tactical or strategic errors—help explain the U.S. catastrophes in Viet Nam and Iraq.”4 While the assertion in the second proposition is debatable, few would deny the truth as described in the first one.

  This ethnocentric attitude and the resulting language barrier may explain why, for example, when Hollywood made the movie BAT 21 in 1998 about the dramatic rescue of an American pilot shot down in Quang Tri province in 1972, it left out the key member of the rescue team: He was South Vietnamese Petty Officer Nguyen Van Kiet, who spent eleven days behind enemy lines helping to locate the downed pilot. For his heroic action, Kiet was awarded the U.S. Navy Cross, the highest award that can be given to a foreign combatant.

  In my opinion, the scarcity of information regarding the performance of ARVN troops was often due to the tendency for self-aggrandizement on the part of some American advisors. “Victory has many children, defeat is an orphan,” goes a saying. In laying claims to the lion’s share in the victory of a battle, such as the successful defense of An Loc, they tended—sometimes unintentionally—to minimize the contribution of the units they were advising. Even General Hollingsworth—who had given due credit to the “little ARVN soldier”—seemed, at times, to have been carried away. In his book Reporting Viet Nam; Media and Military at War, William M. Hammond reported that General Hollingsworth declared during an interview with Newsweek that he intended to “kill” all of the An Loc attackers before they returned to Cambodia. In a subsequent taped interview with CBS News, Hollingsworth said he had refused to approve the Red Cross’s proposal to declare a temporary cease-fire in order to evacuate the wounded. Hammond added that: “Since it was clear that Hollingsworth considered himself the commander at An Loc even though a South Vietnamese officer was technically in charge, the remark contradicted U.S. assertions that the South Vietnamese were in total control of their own affairs. Soon after the interview appeared, indeed, an angry General Abrams instructed Hollingsworth to shut his mouth.”5 ARVN officers in III Corps held General Hollingsworth in high esteem; they appreciated his determination and invaluable contribution to the An Loc victory. Sadly, good men with the best of intentions are not immune to mistakes.

  It is no secret, on the other hand, that for one reason or another, the U.S. media was biased—if not outright hostile—to the Viet Nam War. The war was presented from the most unfavorable angles with the media sensationalizing the news and distorting the truth if necessary to achieve its antiwar objectives. During the 1968 Tet Offensive, for example, in the heavily damaged Ben Tre province in the Mekong Delta, an unnamed U.S. advisor, in response to reporters’ remarks about the destruction of the city, stated that “it became necessary to destroy Ben Tre in order to save it.” This unfortunate remark has since been used time and again by antiwar activists and politicians. In his book Reporting Viet Nam, William Hammond wrote, “The New York Times seized upon the remark as soon as it appeared. So did Time. From there it passed into the lore of the war to become one of the most serviceable icons of the antiwar movement.”6 Under these conditions, reporting the victory of An Loc would contradict the U.S. media’s basic premise that the war cannot be won because the ARVN was a corrupt and ineffective force.

  I believe that it is time to set the record straight. Without denying the tremendous contribution of the U.S. advisors and pilots to the success of An Loc, this book is written primarily to tell the South Vietnamese side of the story and, more importantly, to render justice to the little South Vietnamese soldier who withstood ninety-four days of horror and prevailed.

  One of the primary sources for this book is the ARVN/Joint General Staff’s report published in 1973, titled Tran Binh Long (The Battle of Binh Long). This report, in particular, contains useful statistical data on the Battle of An Loc, including the rescue operations on Route Nationale 13.

  In researching my book, I relied heavily on multiple Vietnamese-language writings on An Loc which were made available after 1975. In particular, Brig. Gen. Tran Van Nhut, former Binh Long province chief, provided invaluable information relative to the performance of provincial forces during the siege in his memoir Cuoc Chien Dang Do7(Unfinished War). A new book Chien Thang An Loc8 (The Victory of An Loc) published in 2007 by Lt. Col. Nguyen Ngoc Anh, former Assistant for Operations, ARVN III Corps, on the other hand, provided insightful information on staff activities and decision-making process at III Corps Headquarters.

  I would like to thank Brig. Gen. Mach Van Truong, former 8th Regiment commander, who has provided me with his personal account of the performance of the 5th ARVN Division units in An Loc. My deep appreciation goes to Col. Phan Van Huan, former 81st Airborne Commando Group, for having made available to me copies of old Airborne Commando editions relating the activities of this elite unit during the last stages of the siege.

  I am especially indebted to numerous fellow officers who readily responded to my requests for interviews or provided me with invaluable historical documents relating to the Battle of An Loc. My special thanks to Col. Nguyen Dinh Sach, former chief of staff, 21st Division, for having provided me with a compilation of various narratives from former officers of that division, who had participated in the relief operation on Route Nationale 13.

  My deepest gratitude, however, goes to my comrades-in-arms who had given their lives in the defense of the city. After the war, the grateful people of An Loc erected a special monument in honor of the fallen soldiers of the 81st Airborne Commando Group. Inscribed on the monument was the following epitaph:

  “An Loc Xa Vang Danh Chien Dia

  Biet Cach Du Vi Quoc Vong Than.”

  (In An Loc, which reverberates the fame of the Battleground, The Airborne Commandos gave their lives for the nation.)

  Although the elite airborne commandos had particularly distinguished themselves during the siege, credit should be given to all defenders of An Loc, regulars as well as territorials, who had prevailed against heavy odds. They have inspired me throughout this book and were a source of constant encouragement for me to carry out this major undertaking. To all these “unsung heroes,” I dedicate this book.

  One

  The Sieges of the Indochina Wars

  In Valley of Decision,1 John Prados and Ray W. Stubbe reported that at the height of the siege of Khe Sanh, in February 1968, Gen. William C. Westmoreland asked Col. Reamer W. Argo, command historian, to make a study comparing Khe Sanh with past sieges and to recommend a course of action for the embattled garrison. Argo and his team found that of the fifteen sieges identified during the twentieth century, defenders resisted successfully only in two instances: the Russians at Leningrad (1941–1944) and the Americans at Bastogne (1944).

  If asked about the successful sieges in the military history of Viet Nam, it is doubtful that the command historian would know that toward the end of the eighteenth century, at the port of Quy Nhon, 280 miles southeast of Khe Sanh, Gen. Vo Tanh, on orders from Emperor Nguyen Anh, held out for two years (from 1779 to 1801) against the Grand Army of T
ay Son, preventing the latter from linking up with its navy in order to launch a coordinated attack on the cities of Phan Thiet and Gia Dinh in the south. The heroic stand of Vo Tanh also allowed Emperor Nguyen Anh’s army to bypass the siege of Quy Nhon to capture Hue on February 2, 1801, and eventually unify the country under the Nguyens’ rule.

  Of course, Colonel Argo couldn’t predict that four years after his presentation, history would record another siege where the defenders resisted successfully: the South Vietnamese at An Loc (1972).

  To study the battle of An Loc it is necessary to compare it with other important sieges of the Indochina Wars. The description of the battle of Dien Bien Phu, in particular, would allow for a comparative study with An Loc, not only in terms of strength, terrain, tactics, and fire support, but also in terms of leadership traits of the respective commanders. On the other hand, the study of the siege of Khe Sanh and its subsequent abandonment amid growing concerns about a repeat of Dien Bien Phu would help explain why the NVA was able to move supplies and men into the battlefields in South Viet Nam in the late 1960s, and build up its forces in the run-up to their 1972 offensive in Binh Long province in MRIII.

  A brief review of major political and military developments in 1949–1951 will help us understand French defense strategy in North Viet Nam and its decision to establish the fortified bases of Nasan and Dien Bien Phu in 1952 and 1953 respectively.

  In October 1949, Mao Tse-tung took over China and since there was no controlled border between China and Viet Nam, the Viet Minh (VM) started to receive increased military aid directly from the Chinese Communist regime, which transferred to them modern, U.S.-supplied weaponry captured from Chang Kai-shek’s defeated Nationalist Army, including artillery guns.

  With increased military aid from the Communist bloc, the Viet Minh was able to form three regular divisions (304th, 308th, and 312th) in 1950, by incorporating their independent regiments in North Viet Nam and in the northern part of Central Viet Nam. To counter-balance the massive Chinese aid to the Viet Minh, Mr. Dean Acheson, U.S. Secretary of State, recommended military assistance to the French forces in Indochina and called for the creation of a Vietnamese National Army in early 1950; the first military equipment began to arrive in October the same year.

  In October 1950, under pressure, the French decided to abandon the border garrison of Cao Bang. The French rescuing columns—consisting of four battalions of Legionnaires, paratroopers and Moroccan Tirailleurs—progressing on Route Coloniale (RC) 4 were ambushed by the VM 308th Division and 209th Regiment. Many units were completely wiped out and the survivors had to abandon their wounded and disperse in small units through the dense forests bordering RC4. The French suffered over 7,000 casualties during the withdrawal operation. The French also lost 13 105mm howitzers, 125 mortars, 480 military vehicles, 3 armored platoons, 940 machineguns and over 8,000 rifles (these losses included weapons that were in storage).2

  It was estimated the above losses could be used to equip two VM divisions. Stunned by the Cao Bang disaster, the French decided to abandon Lang Son. In Lang Son, the French left 1,300 tons of ammunition and other military supplies they didn’t have time to destroy.3

  To exploit their victories at Cao Bang and Lang Son, in January 1951 the Viet Minh launched a daring attack on Vinh Yen, just twenty-five miles west of Hanoi with the 308th and 312th Divisions, but Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap’s first attempt at conventional warfare was defeated by the timely reinforcement of the battlefield by Gen. Jean De Lattre de Tassigny, the new Commander-in-Chief of French forces in Indochina and the use for the first time in Viet Nam of napalm bombs supplied by the United States. The Viet Minh suffered 6,000 casualties and 500 prisoners were captured. The French losses were about half those of the Viet Minh. 4

  Nasan (November–December 1952)

  In October 1952, Gen. Raoul Salan, who had replaced Gen. De Lattre de Tassigny—diagnosed with inoperable cancer the previous year—launched Operation Lorraine aimed at diverting Viet Minh forces from the Red River Delta and cutting the enemy rear lines of communications in the strategic Thai Highlands near the Laotian border. But Vo Nguyen Giap refused to engage the French forces and Lorraine was forced to withdraw without achieving its goals.

  To thwart the Viet Minh’s threat to the Thai Highlands and North-Laos, General Salan took advantage of Lorraine to establish in November 1952 a fortified base at Nasan, approximately 120 miles west of Hanoi. Salan believed that it was too dangerous to venture on narrow and tortuous roads through the forested mountains of the Thai country and that the best way to fight the Viet Minh there was to rely instead on strong bases built around an airstrip in selected strategic areas. The new concept of the “air-ground base”—a term coined by Martin Windrow,5 an Associate of the Royal Historical Society in Great Britain—would allow the French to establish a presence in the Thai country, to reinforce and resupply the garrison by air and to destroy the attacking forces with superior artillery fire and air power.

  Nasan is a two-kilometer-long and one-kilometer-wide valley surrounded by small rolling hills. It had an airstrip that could accommodate transportation aircraft in use in the French Army at the time. Salan occupied Nasan with three paratroop battalions, five infantry battalions, one engineer battalion, and one armored reconnaissance company. The defending units included the newly formed 31st VN Groupement Mobile (GM) consisting of two infantry battalions and one artillery battalion. The Nasan garrison was commanded by Colonel Gilles, the paratroop commander.

  In installing the fortified Nasan base, Salan wanted to achieve three goals: a) to assemble the small garrisons located in the northwest and southeast of Nasan and to save them from being overrun by the Viet Minh; b) to thwart the enemy’s attempt to take over the Thai Highlands; and c) to induce the enemy to attack and to destroy their regular forces by artillery and air power. 6

  True to Salan’s expectations, the Viet Minh began to launch probing attacks on the night of November 23. During the nights of November 30 and December 1, the Viet Minh attacked in force and succeeded in capturing two outer strongpoints. The latter were retaken by counter-attacks by the units from the inner ring of defensive positions. At one point, the French had to drop paratroopers on the top of one of the hills captured by the Viet Minh to attack downhill and destroy the enemy in their bunkers. The Vietnamese artillery battalion from the 31st VN GM inflicted heavy casualties on the attackers during two days of fighting. Due to the lack of enemy artillery and anti-aircraft, the French Air force was able to maintain supply and casualty evacuation flights.

  The French reported the Viet Minh suffered 5,000 losses during the battle of Nasan.7 The French losses were modest and the “air-ground base” concept had subsequently gained acceptance within French military circles. Colonel Gilles, commander of the troops in Nasan, was elevated to brigadier-general for his successful defense of the fortified base.

  Dien Bien Phu (November 1953–May 1954)

  In May 1953, Gen. Henri Navarre assumed command of the French forces in Indochina. Convinced of the effectiveness of the “air-ground base”concept—which had been hailed as a great success in Nasan the previous year—Navarre decided to install a bigger camp retranché at Dien Bien Phu, a densely populated Thai village located near the Laotian border, approximately 300 kilometers west of Hanoi and 180 kilometers northeast of Luang Prabang, the royal capital of Laos.

  Dien Bien Phu is a long valley traversed by the Nam Youm River and surrounded by a ring of mountains located at a distance of ten to twelve kilometers from the center of the camp retranché. The garrison itself held a perimeter of approximately sixteen by nine kilometers. General Navarre believed that the Dien Bien Phu camp would be out of range of enemy artillery if they positioned their batteries on the other side of the mountains. And if they put their batteries on the slopes facing the base, they would be easy targets for French artillery and warplanes.

  According to Navarre, a fortified “air-ground base” at the heart of the Thai country would help ac
hieve the following objectives: a) to force the Viet Minh to accept a bataille rangée in which the French had superiority in firepower and supply; b) to prevent the Viet Minh from reinforcing the coastal regions of Central Viet Nam that the French planned to pacify; c) to establish a barrier to interdict VM forces from attacking North-Laos; and d) to use Dien Bien Phu as a springboard to attack the enemy’s rear in case the latter renewed their offensive on the Red River Delta.8

  In November 1953, the French launched Operation Castor to reoccupy Dien Bien Phu, which had been lost to the Viet Minh in November the previous year. On November 11, General Gilles and three French paratroop battalions were dropped into the valley of Dien Bien Phu. They met only scattered resistance from VM local units. After the successful air drop and the occupation of Dien Bien Phu, General Gilles was replaced by Colonel De Castries, an armor officer with extensive combat experience.

  Map 2: Dien Bien Phu

  Dien Bien Phu was a complex of multi-strongpoints consisting of three distinct sectors:

  —The central sector with five strongpoints (Anne Marie, Huguette, Claudine, Eliane, and Dominique) surrounding the airstrip.

  —The northern sector consisting of two strongpoints (Beatrice and Gabrielle) established on two hills overlooking the valley.

  —Strongpoint Isabelle, located six kilometers south of the central sector; adjacent to this strongpoint was an old airstrip that was out of service.9