Hell in An Loc Read online

  In March 1954, at the beginning of the major attack, the Dien Bien Phu camp had twelve infantry battalions (including the 5th VN Airborne Battalion). The artillery units supporting Dien Bien Phu consisted of 24 105mm howitzers, 4 155mm howitzers and 22 120mm mortars.

  The French also had one armored company (-) at Dien Bien Phu with ten M-24 tanks. In addition, six Bearcat fighters and ten light observation aircraft were available at Dien Bien Phu for tactical air support and reconnaissance.10

  To prepare for the attack, from mid-December 1953 to the end of January 1954, Giap engaged the 308th and 312th Divisions, three regiments from the 316th and 304th Divisions, and one independent regiment. The attacking forces were supported by 36 105mm howitzers, 15 75mm guns, 20 120mm mortars and 36 37mm anti-aircraft guns from the 351st Artillery Division.11 The attacking force, including supporting units, was estimated at about 30,000 men, not counting over 30,000 civilian laborers responsible for repairing roads and carrying ammunition and supplies to the front.

  The Viet Minh attacked the northern strongpoints in force on March 13. Elements of the 308th Division and 312th Divisions, supported by powerful artillery preparations, quickly overran strong-point Beatrice with repeated human-wave assaults. Gabrielle offered furious resistance but was overrun on March 15. The French were completely taken by surprise by the effectiveness of the enemy direct artillery fire from their batteries well bunkered on the hill slopes facing Dien Bien Phu. The constant shelling of the airfield by the VM artillery and anti-aircraft fire made its use precarious from the beginning of the attack. The airfield was completely closed on March 28, limiting resupply and reinforcement by air drops into the steadily shrinking perimeter. Worse, the Thai units, frightened by the deadly enemy shelling, began to desert en masse after the first attacks, causing the French to reorganize their defense system and to reduce further the perimeter.

  The Viet Minh launched a new attack during the night of March 30. Elements of the 312th Division and 316th Division succeeded in capturing parts of strongpoints Eliane and Dominique in the central sector after furious had-to-hand combat. The piecemeal reinforcement by nightly airdrops of paratroopers was used mainly to replace casualties and the lack of reserves prevented the French from mounting any significant counter-attack to recapture the lost positions.

  After April 7, the situation became relatively calm and the Viet Minh took advantage of that respite to dig new trenches deep into French positions. To encourage and show support for the garrison, the French government decided to elevate all defenders to the next higher rank. De Castries was made a brigadier-general, and his new rank insignia had to be airdropped into the camp.

  The final assault began on May 6. The Viet Minh overran the remaining positions on Eliane immediately east of the central sector. In the southwest, the defense of Claudine collapsed after repeated enemy human-wave assaults. On the morning of May 7, the Viet Minh attacked the last French positions around General De Castries’ command post. De Castries knew the situation was hopeless; he asked Hanoi for permission to surrender to save what was left of the battered garrison. Hanoi agreed to let him act according to the circumstances. Dien Bien Phu surrendered to the enemy at 5:00 P.M. the same day.

  French losses were 8,221, including 1,571 killed; 11,721 were made prisoners. According to a French document, the Viet Minh losses amounted to 9,500 killed.12

  The Dien Bien Phu disaster marked the end of the French presence in Indochina and sparked a chain of political events leading to the involvement of the United States in this part of the world, in compliance with its post-World War II “containment” policy. Under this concept, the U.S. objective was to “contain” Communist expansion in South East Asia by supporting a non-Communist government in South Viet Nam.

  General Navarre, the commander of French forces in Indochina, was relieved of his command on June 4; the French government fell on June 12. The new French Prime Minister Mendes-France promised to achieve a cease-fire within one month. Peace talks, instigated by the French government during the battle of Dien Bien Phu, had begun at Geneva on May 8. The Geneva Accords were signed in July. The agreement stipulated that Viet Nam would be partitioned at the 17th parallel and a general election would be held in two years, in 1956. Mr. Ngo Dinh Diem, back from exile in the United States, was appointed prime minister of the post-war government in the South. On October 23, 1955, Mr. Diem, having consolidated his political power, organized a national referendum, which resulted in the overthrow of Emperor Bao Dai and the formation of the First Republic. Mr. Diem, the new President of South Viet Nam, renounced the Geneva Accords.

  One of the reasons—often ignored—of the French defeat in Indochina was the lack of unity of purpose among the participants. While the United States, which provided military aid to the French forces, was counting on the French to fight a proxy war to thwart Communist expansion in South East Asia, the French were pursuing their own interests in their former colonies. In the meantime, the Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians—who were fighting with the French against Communist domination—also fought for the ultimate political liberation of their countries from French colonial rule. Thus, France, to the very end, had failed to spell out clearly her objectives in Indochina, and to build a consensus for the prosecution of a controversial and unpopular war.

  Another cause of the failure of French policy in Indochina, in my opinion, was France’s opposition to any progressive and orderly development of the States of Indochina toward true independence in concert with the emergence of genuine nationalist governments and, more importantly, the early creation of strong national armies.

  The following table sums up the evolution of the Vietnamese National Army from 1949 to July 1954, the date of the signing of the Geneva Accords:13

  Please note that the numbers shown on the above table for 1949 to 1951 include the effective forces of various paramilitary units and armed religious groups in existence at the time.

  The following table shows the comparative strength of the National Army and the Viet Minh regular forces at the end of 1952:14

  National Army: 94,520, consisting of:

  - 57 infantry battalions

  - 5 airborne battalions

  - 3 artillery battalions

  - 6 reconnaissance armored squadrons

  - Various combat support units

  Viet Minh: 270,000, consisting of:

  - 6 infantry divisions: 304, 308, 312, 316, 320, 325

  - 1 artillery division

  - 8 engineer battalions

  In 1954, when Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap hurled his regular divisions against the embattled French forces in Dien Bien Phu, the National Army still operated mostly at battalion level. Although it was decided to create six regimental task forces or Groupements Mobiles (GM) in 1952, only four of them actually participated in combat operations before the end of the Indochina War.

  Following the French disengagement from Indochina, in April 1956, the U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) was established in Saigon to take over the training of the South Vietnamese armed forces from the French. In December 1960, the Communists announced the formation of the National Liberation Front (NLF), the political arm of the Viet Cong (VC) and in May 1961, President Kennedy decided to send a contingent of Special Forces to help fight the fledging communist insurgency in South Viet Nam. In February the following year, MAAG became U.S. Military Assistance Command, Viet Nam (MACV) under Gen. Paul Harkins.

  In the meantime, the Diem regime became increasingly more repressive. Diem tolerated no organized opposition; his critics were harassed or arrested and his decrees became laws. On January 2, 1963, the VC scored a psychological victory in the Mekong Delta: for the first time, a VC battalion stood up and fought against regular ARVN units at Ap Bac in Dinh Tuong province, causing moderate losses to a unit of the 7th Division. The government crackdown on the Buddhists in the fall triggered an increasingly powerful anti-Diem movement. As the political and military situation worsened, a group of g
enerals led by Lt. Gen. Duong Van Minh staged a coup d’etat to overthrow the Diem regime. President Diem and his brother, Mr. Nhu, were assassinated on November 2, 1963.

  Khe Sanh (January–April 1968)

  In June 1964, Gen. Williams Westmoreland took over the command of MACV. By that time, Hanoi, taking advantage of the political instability in Saigon in the post-Diem era, had begun to send NVA regular units to reinforce the VC in the South.

  On August 4, 1964, two U.S. destroyers on routine patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin reported torpedo attack; they returned fire and sank two North Vietnamese PT boats. On August 7, the U.S. Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, authorizing President Johnson to send troops to Viet Nam.

  On March 8, 1965, a U.S Marine task force of 3,500 men landed in Danang. This was the beginning of a massive U.S. build-up reaching 549,000 men in 1968 at the peak of the Viet Nam War.

  Parallel to this American build-up, a gradual change in military strategy took place. When the first U.S. units arrived in South Viet Nam in 1965, their mission was only to defend the airbases and protect the populated areas and logistical installations in the coastal areas under the “enclave concept.” In June 1965, the American ground troops were allowed to conduct offensive operations anywhere in South Viet Nam. General Westmoreland’s concept of “search and destroy”—sometimes called “big units warfare”—replaced the old concept of enclave. The objective of this new strategy was to inflict defeat on the enemy, rather than simply deny him victory.

  In 1967, Westmoreland, concerned about increased enemy infiltration from Laos, ordered the U.S. III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF)—which was responsible for tactical operations in the five northernmost provinces of South Viet Nam—to fortify and reinforce the Khe Sanh base situated on Route 9, about seven miles from the Laotian border.15

  The village of Khe Sanh was the seat of Huong Hoa district, an area consisting mostly of Bru Montagnard villages and coffee plantations. Back in 1962, the Special Forces had built an airfield outside the village at the site of the old French fort. In 1967, Khe Sanh base was occupied by various U.S. Marine units as an outpost on the Marines’ western flank.

  Map 3: Khe Sanh

  In April 1967, two battalions from the 3rd Marine Regiment reinforced Khe Sanh and were ordered to dislodge NVA units from the strategic hills northwest of the base. The enemy was driven out of this area after heavy engagements. Enemy losses amounted to 940 casualties. The Marines suffered 165 killed and 425 wounded.16

  In January 21, 1968, elements of the 325th NVA Division attacked Hill 861, five kilometers northwest of Khe Sanh; the enemy was beaten back after heavy close-quarters combat. At the same time, the NVA shelled Khe Sanh base with hundreds of mortar rounds and 122mm rockets. One artillery shell scored a direct hit on the main ammunition depot and set off a series of detonations. At the time of the NVA artillery attack, Khe Sanh was manned by three battalions of the 26th Marines under the command of Colonel Lownds.

  Coincidental with the artillery barrage on Khe Sanh base, elements of the 304th NVA Division attacked the Huong Hoa district headquarters. The ethnic Bru members of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) and ARVN Regional Force held out until the next morning, when the survivors were picked up by Marine helicopters. The presence of the 304th NVA Division in the area prompted the 3rd Marine Division to reinforce Khe Sanh with one battalion from the 9th Marine Regiment on January 22. Five days later, ARVN I Corps sent the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion to Khe Sanh to reinforce the defense of the garrison.17

  On January 30, 1968, the second day of the new Year of the Monkey, the VC, violating the customary three-day truce on that special occasion, launched a massive attack on major urban centers in South Viet Nam, including Saigon. The situation around Khe Sanh remained calm but the Imperial City of Hue received the brunt of the VC thrust. The enemy occupied most of the city in the first few days and the 1st ARVN Infantry Division headquarters, trapped inside the Citadel, was under heavy attack.

  On February 7, as if to sow confusion with regard to the enemy’s main thrust, elements of the NVA 304th Division, supported by twelve PT-76 tanks (Russian-built light amphibious reconnaissance tanks equipped with a 76.2mm gun), overran the Special Forces base at Lang Vei on Road 9, ten kilometers southwest of Khe Sanh. The Special Forces team and the Bru CIDGs managed, however, to destroy some of the tanks. The next day, the Marines at Khe Sanh base sent helicopters to pick up the survivors. The CIDGs suffered 200 killed or missing and 75 wounded. The U.S Special Forces team losses amounted to ten killed and eleven wounded.18

  The NVA launched their biggest artillery bombardment on February 23. Over 1,000 rounds of 130mm and 152mm hit Khe Sanh base during eight hours, killing ten and wounding fifty-one.19 On February 28, elements of the 304th Division attacked the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion on the eastern perimeter of Khe Sanh base. Supported by Marine artillery, the rangers beat back multiple enemy assaults.

  The situation quieted down during the month of March. Under pressure from Washington, which was concerned about a repeat of Dien Bien Phu, General Westmoreland ordered the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division, reinforced with ARVN 3rd Airborne Brigade, to launch Operation Pegasus to relieve the Khe Sanh garrison. The relief operation, which began April 1, met light resistance; it ended April 8, when elements of the 7th Cavalry Brigade linked up with the Marines at Khe Sanh.20

  General Westmoreland, however, insisted that Khe Sanh continue to be occupied, albeit by a smaller Marine unit. One week after he left Viet Nam, on June 11, his successor, Gen. Creighton W. Abrams ordered the destruction and evacuation of the Khe Sanh combat base.

  In Valley of Decision, Prados and Stubbe reported that, over the length of the siege, “tactical aircraft delivered 39,179 tons of ordnance against 59,542 brought by B-52s. That amounts to almost 1,300 tons of bombs around Khe Sanh, the equivalent of 1.3-kiloton tactical nuclear weapon, every day of the siege. Allied aircraft were delivering approximately five tons of bombs for every one of 20,000 NVA soldiers initially estimated to be in the Khe Sanh area, or more than 15 tons per man measured against roughly 6,450 Marines and ARVN troops in the garrison.”21 It was estimated that NVA lost from 10,000 to 15,000 KIA during the siege of Khe Sanh versus U.S. official casualties figures of 205 KIA, 1,668 wounded, and 25 missing and presumed dead.22 (These figures included only U.S. Marines casualties and not losses of U.S. Special Forces units in Lang Vei village and losses incurred by helicopters and air force crews.)

  In February 1968, Khe Sanh was used again as a base for a new—and the last—incursion into Laos: At the instigation of the Americans, ARVN troops launched Operation Lam Son 719 to destroy NVA’s supply line to the South. The White House and the Pentagon reasoned that if successful, the attack into Cambodia and Laos would secure the safe withdrawal of the American troops in South Viet Nam. ARVN units were heavily engaged by NVA divisions on Route 9 and suffered a large number of casualties. On March 6, ARVN troops launched a successful air assault into Tchepone, the objective of the attack, and discovered many enemy bodies. However, they failed to destroy the enemy depots and logistical installations, because by then the NVA had moved their supplies South through new roads which bypassed Tchepone.

  The failure of Lam Son 719 to destroy NVA supplies, the abandonment of Khe Sanh, and the subsequent drawdown of U.S. troops gave Hanoi a free hand to send materials and men to build up their forces in the South in preparation for their 1972 Easter invasion.

  Two

  Setting the Stage

  Tay Ninh, Binh Long, Phuoc Long, Long Khanh, and Binh Tuy, the northern provinces of Military Region III (MRIII), with their dense forests, small hills, and low elevations, offer a sharp contrast to the lush and flat rice fields immediately to the south. They form a natural arc extending from Cambodia to the west and north to the South China Sea to the east. This area constitutes the southernmost foothills of the Chaine Annamitique and a quasi-buffer zone between the Mekong Delta and the Central Highlands.

  The
area known as Dong Nai Thuong (Upper Valley of Deer)—squeezed between the Song Be River to the east and the Saigon River to the west—contains some of the most beautiful forests consisting of a vide variety of tropical trees—including teaks and other precious species. It also contains some of the richest rubber plantations in the world. At the beginning of the twentieth century, after the situation in Indochina had been temporarily stabilized, the French colonialists began to exploit this fertile region in conjunction with large swaths of uncultivated lands in adjacent Cambodia to plant rubber trees. The soil in this area, in fact, contains a red laterite clay that is very suitable to the culture of rubber trees. Two administrative agencies were established at Hon Quan (1908) and Ba Ra (1920) to supervise the forest abatement and road construction projects. Two Routes Nationales (RN) as well as a railway linking Saigon to Loc Ninh were built. These arteries served to transport rubber from the French plantations in Krek, Chup, Prek, Kompong Cham, Snoul, and Peanch Chang in Cambodia, and Binh Long, Phuoc Long, Binh Duong, and Bien Hoa, to Saigon, for exportation.

  The various French plantations in the area formed an association called Société Des Plantations Des Terres Rouges (Society of the Plantations of the Red Lands). The French colons who owned these plantations lived in huge mansions complete with tennis courts, swimming pools, and Cambodian and Montagnard servants. (It is worth noting that the word “montagnards”—which has a distinct racial connotation—was given by the French to the tribes who lived in the montagnes; the Vietnamese preferred to call them Nguoi Thuong or Highlanders, as opposed to Nguoi Kinh or Lowlanders.) The luxurious life of these French colons was, in certain aspects, reminiscent of the life of the former American plantation owners in the South. Most of these French plantations also contained small runways of terre battue, which could accommodate small single-engine aircraft called les Moranes. (These aircraft were used as observation planes in the French Army during the Indochina War.) It was no secret that, under the French Colonial administration, some of these planteurs used these light and versatile airplanes to smuggle opium from Laos that they resold with impunity at exorbitant prices to the Chinese fumeries in Cho Lon.